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Abstract 
 
Assessing the Effectiveness of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme through the Oil and Gas Sector 
 
Mark William Reid, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Carey King 
 
Following the initiation of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) in 2005 the scheme has received significant criticism pertaining to a lack of 
transparency in its operational mechanics and an inability to present conclusive evidence 
that it has encouraged a reduction in monitored emissions. This study utilizes an adaptation 
of the event study methodology proposed by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) 
in order to assess the impact of the EU ETS on emissions in the European oil and gas sector 
as a sample reflective of the scheme on the whole. In doing so, this study compares the 
annual emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane for dual listed, single listing 
and cross listed oil and gas companies on the New York Stock Exchange and the London 
Stock Exchange and how these emissions change over the period 2000-2017; from prior to 
the EU ETS until the period of most recent data availability. Analysis conducted on the 
data gathered infers that, while the EU ETS may have exerted some influence on operators’ 
behavior, the scheme has generally been ineffective in achieving its goal of lowering 
emissions and encouraging economic growth.  
 vii 
 
This study also explores the limitations of the EU ETS and potential drivers of 
emissions changes for operators within the scheme. Through such discussion the intention 
is to better understand the tradeoff between the advantages of cap-and-trade, a quantity 
mechanism, and emissions taxation, a pricing mechanism. These mechanisms comprise the 
majority of the presently adopted emissions policies globally, including the EU ETS, and 
China’s and Canada’s emissions trading schemes. Therefore, in better understanding the 
implications and effects of these mechanisms, the intention is to contribute to the future 
adoption and implementation of global emissions policies. 
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Chapter 1:  The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
SECTION 1.1:  INTRODUCTION TO THE EU ETS 
Section 1.1.1:  Context for the Development of the EU ETS 
The establishment of the EU ETS comes as a consequence of global climate activism 
relating to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions (Bomberg, 2012; Skjaerseth, 2014). 
Roser-Renouf et al.’s (2014) summary of the origins of climate change activism points to its 
beginnings in the mid to late 20th century, gaining mainstream popularity by the turn of the century, 
particularly in Europe. As a response to the resulting social pressures and its previous failure to 
instigate a carbon tax (Convery 2009) the European Commission, the legislative and decision-
making body of the EU, considered regulatory changes in order to combat concerns relating to the 
emissions of greenhouse gases. 
However, the regulatory conditions which resulted in the initiation of the EU ETS as we 
recognize it today can be traced back to the early 1990’s with the signing of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. In 1997, the signing of the Kyoto Protocol 
would also influence the construction of the EU ETS (Shishlov, Morel and Bellassen, 2016; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2018; Climate Policy Info 
Hub, 2019). Through the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol, the majority of Europe had 
committed to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 8% between 1990 and the 2008-2012 
period (European Commission, 2019c). Initially, the European Commission proposed a carbon tax 
in 1992 (Convery, 2009) while also arguing for the inclusion of emissions trading within the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997. Over the course of five years, 1992 to 1997, the European Commission had 
rapidly shifted its standpoint, from fervently against to strongly in favor of emissions trading 
(Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009). Skjaerseth and Wettestad (2009) argue that this shift occurred 
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as a result of three key drivers, the decision to include emissions trading within the Kyoto 
Protocol’s commitments (including provisions pertaining to international trading), the 
attractiveness of cap-and-trade as a flexible market-based instrument, and the entrepreneurial 
approach favored by the European Commission in order to stimulate economic growth in the EU. 
Through a combination of these factors, and the learnings from a failure to impose a carbon tax 
(Convery, 2009) the EU was convinced and the EU ETS initiated Phase I in 2005 (European 
Commission, 2019a).  
It is tempting to think of the European Commission, and by extension the EU, as a unified 
body acting as one. However, this is not the case. In reality, efforts by specific member states of 
the EU exerted strong influence on the position of the Commission overall (Convery, 2009; 
Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009). The activist efforts of the United Kingdom and Denmark, in 
particular, significantly influenced the position of the Commission (Convery, 2009). Germany’s 
strong position within the EU itself, and its long term fixation upon renewable energies, also 
exerted considerable influence on the EU’s motivations to develop a cap-and-trade scheme 
(Apunn, 2019). 
Section 1.1.2:  The EU ETS Cap-and-Trade Mechanism 
As outlined in Section 1.2.1, the EU ETS is a multi-phase long term instrument designed 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across a number of high-emitting sectors across Europe. The 
cap-and-trade mechanism through which the scheme operates is based upon the premise of 
establishing a market for carbon. The market should then dictate the value of one unit (a metric 
ton in this case) of carbon dioxide, or any equivalent monitored emission. In theory, the scheme 
should therefore encourage the emitters to reduce their emissions or risk impacting their bottom 
line, although the challenge lies in encouraging innovation and efficiency without bankrupting 
emitters (Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009). Under the conditions that emitters cannot meet the caps 
established by the scheme, the carbon market allows emitters to purchase unused allowances from 
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other parties within the market. Additionally, this market has evolved over the course of the 
scheme, from national carbon markets in Phase II to a singular market across the entire EU ETS 
in Phase III (Schaefer, 2018). The total emissions allowance for each industry is adjusted annually, 
becoming more stringent each year and therefore increasing the requirement for operators to either 
purchase allowances or reduce their emissions (OECD, 2018; Environmental Defense Fund, 
2019). Through this method, the EU ETS’ intention is to ensure the lowering of emissions by 
operators by imposing financial penalties if they fail to do so or fail to acquire additional 
allowances (Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009). In this way, a successful EU ETS cap-and-trade with 
a reasonable cost of emissions and severe financial penalties for lack of compliance should 
encourage a reduction in emissions within the monitored industries year-on-year. 
As a market-based response to greenhouse gas emissions, cap-and-trade is intended to 
represent a method of reducing emissions that allows the market to set the price for carbon in a 
similar way in which the price of companies on the public markets are dictated by market supply 
and demand (Environmental Defense Fund, 2019). By giving pricing power to the market, and 
controlling annual caps, the EU’s intention was to allow for efficient emissions pricing while 
allowing for certainty regarding future emissions caps (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 
2019). As noted by Koch et al. (2016) the scheme was relatively successful in establishing a 
functioning carbon market whereby the cost of carbon, and other monitored emissions, responded 
organically to regulatory events, in the same way as the stock markets react. This flexibility is also 
noted by Goulder and Schein (2013) as a potential advantage of cap-and-trade over emissions 
taxation. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2019) states that effectively designed cap-
and-trade programs provide control over the variable in question, flexibility for the emitters to 
tailor their compliance path to their needs, and incentives for efficiency, innovation and early 
pollution reductions. In principle, this is how the EU ETS was intended to operate. As the EU 
reduced the allowances for emitters year-on-year (the “caps”), the intention was that companies 
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would be incentivized to pursue efficiency and innovation to reduce their emissions. As an 
alternative, the EU ETS would allow emitters to purchase unused allowances from other emitters 
in the market (the “trade”). In this way, the EU ETS was intended to represent a multinational 
collaboration across multiple industries with a set commitment to lowering emissions through 
time. Allowances were anticipated to be in sufficient demand to keep the price of emissions 
sufficiently buoyant so as to incentivize the pursuit of efficiency and innovation in reducing 
emissions. However, in utilizing a market based approach through cap-and-trade the EU exposed 
itself to significant emissions pricing risk and exposed the scheme to potential exploitation by the 
markets. 
Section 1.1.3:  Scheme Outline to Date 
Phase I (2005-2007) 
The initial phase of the EU ETS represented a three year pilot to prepare participants for 
full adoption of the scheme during Phase II. The second phase was intended to align with the 
meeting of the EU’s commitments to the Kyoto Protocol (Climate Policy Info Hub, 2019; 
European Commission, 2019a). This first phase exclusively covered carbon dioxide emissions 
from power generation and energy-intensive industries, including the oil and gas upstream industry 
and oil refineries, with free allowances and a 40 euro penalty per metric ton released above 
compliance with these allowances (European Commission, 2019a). In doing so, the EU established 
the world’s first carbon market and established the necessary infrastructure for continued 
monitoring and verification of emissions within the sectors covered by the scheme (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018; Climate Policy Info Hub, 2019; European 
Commission, 2019a). This phase also established the first effective price of carbon. Over this pilot 
phase, the price of carbon experienced significant fluctuations, starting at roughly 10 euros per 
metric ton of carbon dioxide (EpMTC) and closing the phase at around the same price 
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(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018). However, throughout much 
of 2006 the price held between 20 and 30 euros per metric ton (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1: Cost of carbon throughout the EU ETS from 2005 to 2015. Sourced from the OECD 
(2018). Note the consistent decrease in the cost of carbon over the entirety of the 
graph and steep reductions associated with particular events for example the 2009-
2010 Hungarian CER scandal. 
 However, due to the fact that caps were set based upon projected future emissions 
allowances during this phase exceeded the total emissions, essentially negating the effective price 
of carbon established upon initiation of this phase (OECD, 2018). Consequently, the EU ETS came 
under early scrutiny and was subject to significant early criticism, a trend which would continue 
throughout the later phases. 
Phase II (2008-2012) 
The second phase of the EU ETS was intended to coincide with the initiation of the first 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (Convery 2009; Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009; Climate Policy Info 
Hub, 2019; European Commission, 2019a). The scope of the EU ETS was expanded to include 
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carbon dioxide emissions from concrete production and the nitrous oxide emissions originating 
from the production of nitric acid (Climate Policy Info Hub, 2019; European Commission, 2019a). 
Additionally, during the final months of this phase carbon dioxide emissions produced by the 
aviation industry within participating countries, which now included Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein, were incorporated (European Commission, 2019a). Given the monitoring and 
verification practices established during Phase I, caps were set for Phase II based upon this 
historical data from the prior phase. Carbon dioxide emissions caps decreased by 6.5% which 
resulted in the first cap auctions, with a non-compliance penalty of 100 euros per metric ton 
(European Commission, 2019a). In total, 28 billion metric tons worth of allowances were traded 
over the course of Phase II aligning with the highest price achieved by caps throughout the EU 
ETS of roughly 35 euros (see Figure 1.1) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2018; European Commission, 2019a). The majority of these caps were traded via 
brokerage networks and exchanges, not through auction and caps were set on a national basis for 
each ETS member country not based upon a cap for the EU ETS as a whole (European 
Commission, 2019a). Again, the EU ETS was subject to criticism for this reliance on brokerage 
networks, and the associated cost of commissions. 
Phase III (2013-2020) 
The third phase of the EU ETS expanded the scope of the scheme to consider the emission 
of perfluorocarbons in addition to the consideration of the mining and smelting industries 
(European Commission, 2019b). Additionally, Phase III established a scheme-wide cap, as 
opposed to the previous method of setting individual caps for each member country (Convery, 
2009; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018). Phase III also 
established auction as the default process by which caps were traded, rather than via brokerage 
networks and exchanges (European Commission, 2019b). This decision came in response to the 
significant criticisms following the over-reliance upon brokerages during Phase II (Convery, 
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2009). Through mandating the use of the auctioning process, the EU ETS also reduced the 
allocation of free caps which was restricted specifically to the development and deployment of 
renewable energy and carbon capture and storage technologies (European Commission, 2019b), 
though there has been allocation of free allowances outside these industries since (Convery 2009; 
Grosjean et al., 2014). The development of such technologies was covered under free caps 
allocated as part of the New Entrants Reserve (European Commission, 2017; 2018). As Phase III 
ends in 2020, Phase IV will result in proposed further reductions in the number of allowances 
distributed. The early regulatory proposals concerning Phase IV have coincided with a slight 
rebound in cap price noted by (Koch et al., 2016) with the effective cost of carbon expected to rise 
from around 14 euros in April 2018 to 30 euros in 2021 (European Commission, 2019b). 
Section 1.1.4:  Criticisms of the EU ETS 
The EU ETS has been widely criticized both for issues pertaining to the emissions market 
itself and the regulatory framework supporting the allocation of allowances and construction and 
regulation of the emissions market. Given that the scheme was the world’s first established carbon 
market (European Commission, 2019a), and the controversial nature of its policy, it is not 
surprising that critiques are frequent. It is also clear that a number of key failings identified a 
significant structural weakness in the way that the EU ETS was established. Webster’s (2017) and 
Reyes and Gilbertson’s (2010) interpretations of the failings of the scheme are based upon 
criticism of its capitalistic approach and therefore its over emphasis upon economic and not 
environmental considerations. However, by focusing on a social critique of the EU ETS, there is 
a tendency to detract from its technical failings.  
De Perthuis (2011) categorizes three fundamental technical failings of the scheme: a 
propensity to allow value-added tax (VAT) carousel fraud, Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) 
trading and allowance thefts. The first of the three is not a specific issue with emissions markets 
or cap-and-trade but pertains to the cross-border trading of allowances whereby the seller charges 
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buyers VAT but does not repay the correct tax authorities. The second, CER trading, refers to the 
2010 Hungarian CER scandal whereby the EU ETS failed to reliably account for previously 
verified emissions. As a result, previously utilized emissions allowances were sold as unused 
allowances. The latter of the three critiques noted by de Perthuis (2011) refers to the prevalence of 
allowance thefts within the EU ETS, which accounted for roughly 0.15% of the emissions traded 
in January 2011. All three of de Perthuis’ (2011) critiques address explicit failings in the structure 
of the EU ETS and though VAT carousel fraud is not specific to cap-and-trade the EU’s lax 
approach to establishing the logistics of the EU ETS led to an opportunity to exploit the scheme. 
Furthermore, the occurrence of allowance theft and a lack of transparency concerning CERs 
significantly damaged the reputation of the EU ETS with the 2010 scandal aligning with a decline 
in carbon prices (see Figure 1.1).  
The EU ETS’ lack of transparency in the trading and auctioning of allowances has received 
heavy criticism more broadly. This lack of transparency makes the scheme susceptible to the 
critiques noted by de Perthuis (2011), Webster (2017) and Reyes and Gilbertson (2010) and 
manifests in the carbon market in a lack of faith in the market mechanism itself. This lack of faith 
relates to a significant flaw in the scheme: the low price of emission on the EU ETS and, by 
extension, the higher costs imposed by other emissions taxes and floor prices within individual EU 
ETS member states. These taxes and floor prices are highlighted in the analysis by Skeates and 
Innes (2018), who attribute an equivalent cost of roughly $16 per metric ton of carbon dioxide 
during Phase III of the EU ETS (see Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2: Equivalent cost of carbon under various carbon policies globally. Sourced from 
Skeates and Innes (2018). Note the relatively low equivalent price of the EU ETS 
and the higher floor prices for countries under the jurisdiction of the EU ETS.  
The relatively low cost of emissions for the EU ETS relative to the unilateral floor prices 
for a number of its member states raise significant questions as to the effectiveness of the scheme. 
Appunn and Sherman (2018) highlight this issue in their discussion of the effectiveness of the EU 
ETS and it is intuitive that a low carbon price in the EU ETS relative to member state floor prices 
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makes it both difficult to establish its effectiveness as an initiative and a logistical challenge to 
operate efficiently. The introduction of a floor price in the United Kingdom and carbon taxation 
in the Scandinavian states suggests the significant lack of member state faith which continues to 
hinder the EU ETS. Koch et al. (2016) argue that the low carbon price of the EU ETS is reflective 
of event-induced price drops concentrated within the earlier years of the scheme’s initiation, which 
aligns with de Perthuis’ (2011) interpretation of the 2010 Hungarian CER scandal. Through Koch 
et al.’s (2016) event study, they infer that carbon price drops correlate strongly with press releases 
pertaining to CER and allowance scandals and makes for a cogent argument that the criticisms of 
the EU ETS have resulted in a depressed carbon price; which has gone on to further damage the 
reputation and efficacy of the scheme. Under a low cost of carbon, the incentive to pursue 
innovation and efficiency is less for emitters and therefore the efficacy of the cap-and-trade 
mechanism for the EU ETS (as described in Section 1.2.3) is significantly weakened. Grosjean et 
al. (2014) also point to the structural failings of the EU ETS as an explanation for the crash in 
carbon prices, citing exogenous shocks, insufficient scheme credibility and market flaws as drivers 
of the crash, aligning with de Perthuis’ (2011) and Koch et al.’s (2016) interpretations. However 
it is worth acknowledging that Koch et al. (2016) also identify positive pricing response to releases 
pertaining to Phase IV regulations and therefore there is potential value in the later phases of the 
scheme.  
Criticisms of the EU ETS’ structure and transparency are ubiquitous throughout the 
literature. Hintermann’s (2015) study on market manipulation suggests that market power, 
particularly in the early stages of the scheme, is the dominant factor in determining compliance 
with the scheme. The findings of the Hintermann (2015) study essentially align with the 
observations by de Perthuis (2011) and Grosjean et al. (2014) that the EU ETS emissions market 
is inherently flawed and easily manipulated. Hintermann (2015) argues that there are 
circumstances whereby the inflation of permit prices through purchasing excess permits would 
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benefit dominant market players in the long run, shown in a sample set of 10 power companies. 
This critique builds on the works of Hintermann (2010) and Hahn and Stavins (2011) and 
collectively these studies directly question an implicit assumption made within this thesis: that the 
introduction of increasingly stringent emissions permits introduces an increasingly relevant 
incentive for operators to reduce emissions over the course of the EU ETS. Although this 
assumption pervades the analysis, it is key to consider that given the structural failings of the EU 
ETS it is plausible that there was a failure to establish such an incentive. While the works of 
Hintermann (2010; 2015) mainly focus on Phase I of the EU ETS, this issue remains a pertinent 
consideration with regards to the conclusions generated under the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, 
criticism of the EU ETS for its lack of transparency and issues surrounding the occurrence of 
unilateral pricing mechanisms within EU ETS member states provide further considerations and 
limitations regarding the conclusions generated by this thesis. 
Section 1.1.5:  Potential Alternatives to the EU ETS 
Given the numerous criticisms leveled at the EU ETS (see Section 1.2.4), and cap-and-
trade generally, a number of alternative measures have been proposed, some of which are briefly 
displayed in Figure 1.2. As a quantity mechanism, a natural alternative to cap-and-trade is the 
option to utilize a pricing mechanism: carbon taxation (Weitzman 1974; Chiu et al., 2015; Zakeri 
et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2016; Tang, Wang and Wei, 2019) (see Section 5.3). There has been 
considerable debate as to whether carbon taxation would have been, and would be in the future, a 
better alternative to cap-and-trade, with a general consensus in the U.S. that the former would be 
a preferential option.  
As shown by Skeates and Innes (2018) there has already been considerable adoption of 
carbon taxation both unilaterally within the EU ETS and outside the EU, for example in Canada. 
Within the economic community there is widespread support for carbon taxation as a more 
efficient and economically sound mechanism than cap-and-trade where there is a lack of 
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transparency in the data (Cropper and Oates; Menanteau, Finon and Lamy, 2003) (see Section 5.3). 
Dissou and Siddiqui (2013) argued that progressive results can be achieved with carbon taxation 
either through low or high case tax levels. Progressive, in this case, is defined as beneficial in 
combatting income inequality and incentivizing greenhouse gas emissions reductions. However, 
more broadly, carbon taxation has been suggested it is a more efficient alternative to cap-and-trade 
due to its more transparent nature and the perception that is a more efficiency mechanism 
(Summers, 2007). Those in favor of these benefits frequently point to the issues discussed in 
Section 1.2.4 as an argument in supporting the implementation of carbon taxation over cap-and- 
trade; and it is broadly true that the use of carbon taxation would reduce the risks noted by de 
Perthuis (2011) and Hintermann (2010; 2015). Instead of addressing emissions quantities through 
the establishment of caps, carbon taxation (and emissions taxation generally) establishes a set price 
for carbon reflective of the verified emissions of the company or industry in question. There is no 
requirement to establish or regulate an emissions market, which reduces risks associated with the 
market (Zhu et al., 2018) though each mechanism has risks and uncertainties associated 
(Weitzman, 1974; Leibowicz, 2018) (see Section 1.2.4). By removing the market’s ability to 
determine the cost of one unit of monitored emissions, emissions taxation also significantly 
reduces the opportunity for market manipulation (Hintermann, 2010; 2015). However, in 
implementing carbon taxation this opens further issues relating to potential tax fraud, in addition 
to a deviation away from the setting of explicit emissions allowances as in cap-and-trade. 
Therefore, although emissions taxation may be capable of solving issues raised by cap-and-trade 
including market crashes, allowance fraud and market manipulation (Hintermann, 2010; de 
Perthuis, 2011; Grosjean et al., 2014) emissions taxation is also subject to its own limitations and 
risk factors (Weitzman, 1974; Leibowicz, 2018).  
From the literature it is clear that economists generally prefer taxation as an alternative to 
cap-and-trade (Summers, 2007). This appears to result from a tendency to prefer any option which 
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reduces the requirement for heavy regulation. For those not from an economic school of thought, 
it is evident that cap-and-trade was considered a better alternative as, on a theoretical level, it 
allows greater control by the governing body (in this case the EU) over emissions reductions 
(Cropper and Oates, 1992; Menanteau, Finon and Lamy, 2003), which is the primary concern of 
environmentalists (Bomberg, 2012; Roser-Renouf, 2014; Skjaerseth, 2014). The reasoning behind 
this intuition lies in the fact that cap-and-trade allows the explicit identification of variable (in this 
case emissions) targets which can be tracked. Goulder and Schein (2013) addressed the advantages 
of carbon taxation versus cap-and-trade, highlighting the issues covered previously in this Section. 
Most specifically, Goulder and Schein (2013) point to a tradeoff between the Weitzman issue and 
Murray-Newell-Pizer issue; pricing uncertainty versus flexibility to respond to new information. 
The conclusions from Goulder and Schein (2013) suggest that carbon taxation, as previously noted, 
is more effective at mitigating pricing uncertainty while cap-and-trade is more effective at 
responding new information. This benefit of cap-and-trade is supported by the results from Koch 
et al.’s (2016) event study. The advantage of being able to respond to new information quickly 
makes the EU ETS more suitable for the event study analysis conducted as part of this thesis but 
overall may not make cap-and-trade a more viable option than emissions taxation, a fact noted by 
Goulder and Schein (2013). 
Another alternative to the EU ETS is the approach adopted by the U.S.: to not implement 
a national carbon policy through either pricing or quantity mechanisms. There is no nationwide 
equivalent to cap-and-trade or emissions taxation in the U.S., although there is a Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative on the east coast statewide policies in California and Oregon (Skeates 
and Innes, 2018; RGGI, 2019). There is some argument to be made that the emissions reduction 
from the U.S. is the result of efficient markets reflecting investor sentiment. Therefore as investor 
priorities shift towards low emissions alternatives, companies shift their practices to reflect 
investor sentiment in order to maintain and improve their market capitalization (Tomain, 1990). 
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However, there is strong evidence to suggest that it is in fact a combination of the broad change 
from coal to natural gas in the power market and the introduction of state-level policy for 
renewables that has resulted in such a reduction (US EPA, 2018). Thus far, the approach has 
proved empirically sound with the U.S. decreasing its carbon dioxide emissions annually at a 
greater rate than the United Kingdom (World Bank, 2019), which has a national floor price above 
the price set by the EU ETS (Skeates and Innes, 2018). Though the U.S. has withdrawn from its 
pledge to the Paris Agreement, it is clear that there is credibility behind the efficient market 
argument. However for now, the U.S. approach is producing results which suggests that there are 
alternatives to method adopted by the EU ETS (World Bank, 2019) and therefore it is important 
to acknowledge this alternative to the scheme. 
 
SECTION 1.2:  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EU ETS  
Section 1.2.1:  Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU ETS 
As a consequence of the EU ETS, the EU established an effective cost of carbon, and 
subsequently costs of nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons, which could significantly impact the 
profitability of emitting companies operating within sectors governed by the scheme relative to 
their peers with less exposure to the scheme. As noted by Skjaerseth and Wettestad (2009) (see 
Section 1.2.2), a successful EU ETS would establish a cost of emissions, to encourage emitter 
innovation and efficiency, but would not establish such a cost at the expense of reducing economic 
growth in the region. Therefore, in assessing the impact of a cost of emissions two variables must 
be considered: emissions quantities and economic growth. 
Verified emissions is evidently a key variable in the consideration of the effectiveness of 
the EU ETS. A successful emissions trading scheme should reduce emissions quantities as caps 
and allowances are reduced (Burtraw and Themann, 2018).  
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Figure 1.3: Changes in EU ETS total verified emissions from 2005 through 2015. Sourced from 
the OECD (2018). Note a decline in allowances (“caps”) from Phase III (2013) 
onward. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2018), 
verified emissions from EU ETS installations decreased by approximately 15% between 2005 and 
the end of 2015 (see Figure 1.3). 
However, the consideration of verified emissions as an isolated variable is not an effective 
method of assessing the efficacy of the EU ETS. Alternative measures that do not utilize cap-and 
trade-have also resulted in greater emissions reductions (see Section 1.2.5).  
The occurrence of the economic recession in 2008 exerted considerable influence on the 
economic performance of emitters. In the oil and gas sector this manifested as a decrease in 
production and refining (Stevenson, 2018) and therefore a decrease in emissions. If the intention 
of the EU ETS is to both reduce emissions and encourage economic growth (Skjaerseth and 
Wettestad, 2009) then the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the rate by which emissions 
decrease relative to GDP emissions intensity must also be considered (see Figure 1.4). The EIA 
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has examined U.S. electric power carbon dioxide emissions from 2000-2017. Fifty percent of the 
carbon dioxide emissions during this period of time as due to lower demand growth alone (EIA, 
2017) (see Figure 1.5). Power accounts for over 50% of EU ETS emissions, therefore lower 
demand growth for power across the EU ETS would exert considerable impact on annual 
emissions and the perceived effectiveness of the scheme on the whole. 
 
Figure 1.4: Change in GDP for the U.S. and the EU over the analysis period. Adapted from 
data sourced from the World Bank (2019). Note the consistent growth in U.S. GDP 
compared with a stalling and subsequent reduction of EU GDP between 2008 and 
2017. 
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Figure 1.5: U.S. electric power carbon dioxide emissions (2000-2017). Sourced from the 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) (2017). Note that lower demand growth 
alone accounts for over 50% of the reduced emissions. 
From Figure 1.4, it is apparent that EU GDP growth outpaced the U.S. throughout Phase I 
(2005-2007) and initially in Phase II (2008-2012) of the EU ETS. EU GDP growth stagnated after 
2008 and began to decline, falling beneath U.S. GDP in 2015 during Phase III of the EU ETS. 
According to Figure 1.3, EU ETS verified emissions increased, and then subsequently declined, 
and stagnated across the 2005-2012 period. EU GDP growth also followed a similar trend. Within 
this same time frame, the global financial crisis was also taking shape, coming to a head in 2008. 
The alignment between EU GDP and emissions reductions, marked by an inflection point at the 
2008 financial crisis, raises serious questions as to the effectiveness of the EU ETS in achieving a 
true reduction in emissions. The similarity of the trends noted in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 suggest that 
much of the emissions reductions achieved during the EU ETS is at least to some degree the result 
of a decline in economic growth resulting from the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. This 
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conclusion is supported by the generous allowances relative to verified emissions (see Figure 1.3). 
The flat allocation of caps during Phase I and Phase II is consistently above the level of verified 
emissions, suggesting that the caps themselves were not sufficiently strict so as to incentivize 
innovation and efficiency in emissions reductions for operators within the scheme. Only in 2008 
do operators’ verified emissions exceed the allocated cap however given the onset of the financial 
crisis at this time it is impossible to differentiate reasons for the emissions reduction which 
followed between the result of a downturn in operations or a reduction resulting from innovation 
and efficiencies. The decreasing cap allowances apparent in Phase III and the coincident decrease 
in verified emissions (see Figure 1.3) lend some credence to the argument that the EU ETS exerted 
influence on a reduction during Phase III. However, given the downturn in EU GDP over the same 
period (see Figure 1.4) it is again impossible to categorically conclude that the EU ETS has been 
an effective mechanism in reducing verified emissions. 
Section 1.3.2:  The Effectiveness of the EU ETS: A German Case Study 
In Section 1.2.5, potential alternatives to the EU ETS were discussed, including the 
approach of the U.S. Much attention has been drawn to the U.S. approach in comparison with 
Germany, which has maintained an anti-nuclear stance since long before the Fukushima-Daiichi 
disaster of 2011 (Breidthardt, 2011) and has displayed an energy policy which some have 
described as “reckless” (Der Spiegel, 2013). Given its influence within the EU and its pro-
renewable approach, Germany has often been considered representative of the success of the EU 
(Magen, 2018) (and the EU ETS) on the whole. However, this pro-renewable approach has not 
necessarily produced the results which Germany, or the EU ETS had hoped for. Germany’s 
commitment to reducing nuclear and its moratorium on hydraulic fracturing within its borders has 
led to a reliance on coal to back up intermittent renewables (see Figure 1.6). This was perversely 
promoted by clean dark spreads (for coal) which were higher than the clean spark spread (for gas), 
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conditions which incentivize the use of coal over natural gas (a significantly lesser emitter of 
greenhouse gases) (Gonzalez 2018; Wilson and Staffell, 2018). 
Figure 1.6: Power generation by source and collective CO2 intensity for this generation for the 
U.S. and Germany. Sourced from ExxonMobil (2017). Note the difference in the 
percentage of power generation from coal in both countries. 
Although Germany has committed to phasing out coal by 2038 (Wald, 2019) it is clear that 
in recent history the country has developed an energy policy which, while supporting the 
development of renewable energy, has facilitated the use of coal to meet a significant portion of 
the country’s energy demand (Lehmann et al., 2015; Geddes, Schmidt and Steffen, 2018; Bianco, 
Driha and Sevilla-Jiménez, 2019). From the furthest right graph in Figure 1.6, it is apparent that, 
without cap-and-trade, the U.S. has been more successful than Germany in reducing the carbon 
dioxide intensity (carbon dioxide per unit of power produced) of electricity generation. This comes 
in some part from an increase in the amount of electricity generated by renewables over the 2005 
through 2015 period. However, the majority of this improvement in the U.S. comes as result of 
coal to gas switching and an increase in the amount of electricity produced from natural gas (EIA; 
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2017, Green, 2018). Germany too has increased its generation from renewable sources, however 
it has failed to reduce the proportion of coal in its energy mix by a factor comparable with the U.S. 
As a consequence of these decisions, Germany has failed to significantly reduce the proportion of 
its electricity generated by coal and is exposed to geopolitical risk through a reliance upon Russian 
natural gas. An additional factor related to the introduction of the EU ETS is that any country 
operating under the scheme has been subject to a diminished clean spark spread. The clean spark 
spread describes the revenue generated for natural gas plant operators while accounting for the 
impact of emissions costs operating under a cap-and-trade scheme (CDC Climat Research, 2013) 
(see Equation 1).  
 
Equation 1: 
𝐶𝑆𝑆 = 𝐸 − 𝐺 − 𝑁𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝐶  
 
𝐶𝑆𝑆 = 𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
𝐸 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑 
𝐺 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑎𝑠 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 
𝑁𝐶𝐶 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑  
𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 
The clean dark spread refers to the same equation (Equation 1) but for coal as opposed to 
gas. As coal is a more carbon intensive power source than gas, it is subject to a higher cost of 
emissions. Thanks to the low cost of carbon credits on the EU ETS and a high cost of gas relative 
to coal, the clean spark spread diminished to a greater extent than the clean dark spread, with clean 
dark spreads often considerably above clean spark spreads in Europe (Carpenter and Abnett, 2018; 
KPMG, 2018) (see Figure 1.7). In other words, the low cost of carbon credits fell short of offsetting 
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the price differential between gas and coal. Consequently, profit margins for natural gas plant 
operators are decreased relative to coal therefore making coal, a higher emitting power source, a 
more appealing and profitable power source for operators. This issue is compounded in Germany, 
where a shift away from nuclear power and a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing of shale left coal 
as one of the only resources remaining to generate base load cheaply and reliably. This example 
illustrates some of the limitations of the EU ETS. 
 
Figure 1.7: Evolution of the clean spark versus the clean dark spread over the latter portion of 
Phase III of the EU ETS. Adapted from KPMG (2018). Note the consistency with 
which the clean dark spread exceeds the clean spark spread, against the intentions 
of the EU ETS. EUR/MWh is Euros per megawatt hour.  
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Chapter 2:  Outline of the Study 
 
SECTION 2.1:  STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
With the closure of Phase III of the EU ETS approaching in 2020, there has been 
considerable discussion regarding the effectiveness of the initiative in lowering the gaseous 
emissions from companies operating within the participating countries (see Section 1). In theory, 
the EU ETS was intended to encourage companies to decrease their carbon footprint and adopt 
alternative and renewable energy sources. The scheme focused primarily on the release of carbon 
dioxide during its initial Phase, with the introduction of nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons during 
the later phases. However, participation in the scheme is only mandatory for companies operating 
in specific sectors for each of the aforementioned gases. The initiative has received significant 
criticism as a consequence of its lack of transparency and a lack of tangible evidence to suggest 
that it has successfully resulted in a decrease in recorded emissions within the sectors under its 
jurisdiction. 
These sectors include power and heat generation, oil refineries, oil and gas upstream 
activities and a number of other energy intensive industries. Consequently, oil and gas companies 
have had significant exposure to the effects of the scheme, both in their direct operations and in 
the sale of their products, and therefore represent a reasonable basis to examine both the direct and 
indirect effects of the EU ETS and its associated amendments and additions. As the uptake of cap-
and-trade and carbon pricing policies increases globally, and as the U.S. considers its own carbon 
policies, now is an appropriate time to assess these effects and whether the use of such initiatives 
is truly an effective method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
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SECTION 2.2:  HYPOTHESIS 
 The hypothesis of this study is that oil and gas companies operating within the purview of 
the EU ETS (represented by European operators) will display a more negative correlation between 
their long term economic performance and changes in the emissions of monitored gases (carbon 
dioxide and nitrous oxide) than companies operating outside the scope of the scheme (represented 
by U.S. operators). Within this overarching hypothesis there are two sub-hypotheses: 
1. The overall correlations between economic performance and the emissions of 
monitored gases over the course of the EU ETS (2005-2017) will be more negative for 
European operators than for U.S. operators. For emissions not monitored by the EU 
ETS (in this case, methane) this trend should not be present or significantly less 
apparent. 
2. The incremental correlations between economic performance and the emissions of 
monitored gases will become increasingly negative through each phase of the EU ETS 
for European operators while there should be little change for U.S. operators. For 
emissions not monitored by the EU ETS (in this case methane) this trend should not be 
present or significantly less apparent. 
In contrast, the correlation between European operators’ economic performance and 
emissions not monitored by the scheme (methane was selected as a basis for unmonitored 
emissions) should fail to display the trends hypothesized above and should show greater parity 
between European and U.S. operators than is the case for carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide. In the 
case that the above sub-hypotheses are accepted, the EU ETS could be regarded a relatively 
effective method of encouraging, either directly or indirectly, a reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
The basis for this hypothesis lies in the understanding that the EU ETS intended to establish 
a link between economic performance and emissions to encourage emissions reductions while 
simultaneously stimulating business growth. Through utilizing a cap-and-trade mechanism, the 
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EU opted for a quantity method which allowed control over the emissions variables and allowed 
the market to set the equivalent cost of emissions. Over the course of the EU ETS, the EU has 
continued to reduce emissions allowances across the scheme which provides a stronger signal to 
operators that they should reduce emissions. An increase in emissions should result in greater 
external costs to operators either through a requirement to purchase additional allowances or 
through penalty payments to the EU ETS. 
 
SECTION 2.3:  LIMITATIONS OF ANALYSIS 
 It is very clear that many factors can influence the financial performance of 
companies and their emissions. Therefore, results conforming to the above hypothesis can only be 
used to suggest possible causality between the EU ETS and financial performance. Results 
conforming to the above hypothesis neither require the conclusions stated nor do they eliminate 
other causes of this correlation. As has already been shown (see Figure 1.5), in the case of the U.S. 
over 50% of the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions was due to reduced demand. This study 
does not attempt to disaggregate the reduction in power demand from the impact of the EU ETS. 
This factor is one of the many not analyzed in this study.  
 
SECTION 2.4:  DATASET CONSTRUCTION 
Section 2.4.1:  Selecting the Oil and Gas Sector as Representative of the EU ETS 
By selecting the oil and gas industry, this thesis opens itself to the critique that its results 
are not reflective of the EU ETS on the whole. However, this decision was made upon the basis 
that; 1) conducting analysis across all sectors of the EU ETS would be too time consuming under 
the scope of this study, 2) many of the failings and results of the oil and gas sector under the EU 
ETS are shared by other sectors within the scheme 3) this author’s personal interest in the sector 
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itself. However, it is acknowledged that the analysis conducted within this thesis can only be used 
to for some very high level observations pertaining to the effect of the EU ETS on the oil and gas 
sector and cannot categorize the scheme as a whole. 
Kortelainen (2018) noted an average decrease of 17.5% in total emissions for the 2005 
through 2017 period across all sectors of the EU ETS. However, this decrease was strongly 
influenced by considerable decreases in the power and heat and lime and cement production 
sectors. Emissions in the oil and gas sector were not successfully reduced during this period, 
despite a significant decrease in the total emissions allocated to the sector by the EU ETS (see 
Figure 3.1). However, the results produced by the Kortelainen (2018) study also suggest that a 
failure to meet emissions allowances is a common trend across the EU ETS (see Figure 3.2). From 
Figure 3.2, it is apparent that oil and gas sector annual verified emission as a percentage of annual 
allowances generally follows the trends of the EU ETS collectively.  
Figure 2.1: Verified versus allowed emissions for the oil and gas sector under the jurisdiction of 
the EU ETS. Data adapted from Kortelainen (2018). Note the flat lining of 
emissions from the oil and gas sector and the significant decrease in allocated 
allowances during Phase III of the EU ETS (2013 to 2020). 
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Figure 2.2: Verified versus allowed emissions for the oil and gas sector relative to other sectors 
under the jurisdiction of the EU ETS. Data adapted from Kortelainen (2018). Note 
the consistent exceedance of allowances across the entirety of the EU ETS 
following allowance reductions starting in 2013. 
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
 
SECTION 3.1:  INTRODUCTION TO THE DATA 
Section 3.1.1:  Public Companies on the NYSE and LSE 
In order to generate an indication of the effectiveness of the EU ETS on the oil and gas 
sector it was necessary to compare the performance of companies subject to the jurisdiction of the 
scheme against those which were not. This method essentially follows that of an event study 
though given the longevity of the EU ETS this specific application is unconventional. Typically, 
the approach outlined by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) is utilized over a period 
before and after a regulatory, company or macroeconomic event covering a period of months. 
However, given that the EU ETS is ongoing and has been active over multiple years the method 
employed in this study differs from those used in previous event studies. By utilizing this method, 
reliable sources of data for both companies operating within Europe and those operating within a 
comparable region not under the purview of the scheme. Consequently, the U.S. was selected as 
this comparable region due to a combination of the scale of its oil and gas sector and the availability 
of data. Associated with this availability of data, the presence of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the U.S. and Europe respectively were 
identified as the most effective sources of information from which to construct the framework for 
the datasets for companies outside and under the jurisdiction of the EU ETS respectively. Given 
that both are public markets, companies listed on each exchange are required to publish annual 
and quarterly updates on company performance from which indicators of economic success could 
be gathered.  
Additionally, the NYSE is the largest stock exchange in the world by market cap and 
therefore was identified as having more stringent listing requirements in addition to containing the 
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stock offerings from a number of large companies which typically publish data more consistently 
and reliably than their smaller counterparts. The LSE was selected as an effective representation 
of companies operating within the jurisdiction of the EU ETS. This exchange was chosen as an 
alternative to the Euronext. Although the Euronext represents a wider sample across the EU, the 
number of oil and gas exploration companies is considerably smaller than is listed on the LSE: 
roughly 3 compared to 150 for the Euronext and LSE respectively. Furthermore, accessing verified 
and updated listings of companies on the Euronext proved significantly more challenging than for 
the LSE. Therefore, the updated and verified lists of oil and gas exploration companies were 
downloaded from the LSE and NYSE in order to build out the dataset framework for conducting 
this study. 
Section 3.1.2:  Building Out the Dataset Framework 
Upon downloading the company listings from both exchanges it became clear that there 
were a number of companies listed on both the NYSE and the LSE. These three companies (Shell, 
Total and BP) are referred to as dual listed companies (DLCs). This means that they are 
incorporated in two different countries, agreeing to operate as if they were a single enterprise; 
however they remain separate legal entities (Bedi, Richards and Tennant, 2003). Given this dual 
listing on both the LSE and NYSE, such companies are inferred to have significant financial 
exposure to policies within both regions in which the company is listed (Europe and the U.S.). 
Consequently, DLCs are a key source of identifying the impact of the EU ETS on the regional 
economic performance of these companies. However, it is entirely unsuitable to analyze DLCs 
within datasets containing companies which do not have the same classification. Therefore, the 
DLCs (Shell, Total and BP) were separated from other companies analyzed, under the DLC 
dataset, within which there is a dataset for both Europe and the U.S. reflecting DLC emissions and 
economic performance for both regions.  
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In addition to the 3 DLCs analyzed, 20 companies were selected from each exchange. 
These companies represented, after the omission of the 3 DLCs, the 20 largest companies by 
market capitalization for each exchange. This selection criteria was finalized based upon the 
assumption that larger companies publish information more consistently and have typically been 
public for longer, meaning greater data availability, than their public counterparts. This dataset, 
comprising 20 NYSE-listed and 20 LSE-listed companies, contains cross-listed and single listing 
companies (CLaSLCs). A cross-listed company refers to an entity which is officially listed on one 
stock exchange, but stocks of which can be purchased on other international exchanges. An 
example of such would be ConocoPhillips which is officially listed on the NYSE but shares of 
which can be purchased through the LSE. Cross-listed companies were treated as single listing 
companies with regards to this analysis. Single listing companies are those which have one official 
listing on any exchange; an example would be EOG resources, which is listed only on the NYSE. 
Within the data gathered for this study single listing companies typically have the majority, or all 
of, their operations within their country of listing and therefore were inferred to have limited 
financial exposure to regulations outside their region of listing. Although this is often not the case 
for cross listed companies, it was logistically easier to group cross listed companies with single 
listing companies as they could not be directly compared with DLCs. The analysis framework for 
each of these datasets was therefore as follows: 
• European data for DLCs was compared against the U.S. data for DLCs 
• Total company data for LSE CLaSLCs was compared against total company data 
for NYSE CLaSLCs 
• European data for LSE CLaSLCs was compared against U.S. data for NYSE 
CLaSLCs 
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In general the approach is to treat the U.S. companies as a control group to determine the 
effect of the EU ETS on the oil and gas sector. However, there are many parameters outside those 
studies which could have effected ether population. 
In selecting a sample from each exchange it is important to acknowledge the limitations 
and reasoning behind the selection process. As stated previously, in selecting the 20 largest 
producers and refiners by market capitalization for each exchange it was intended to maximize 
data consistency and reliability. Through the selection of these 20 CLaSLCs, from the 125 and 152 
oil and gas producers and refiners listed on the NYSE and LSE respectively, it was also intended 
that the sample datasets would reflect the performance of their respective exchanges on the whole 
(see Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Median return on equity on the NYSE and LSE for oil and gas producers and 
refiners. EU ETS Phases I (2005-2007), II (2008-2012), III (2013-Present). Data 
sourced from Macrotrends (2018). Note the trend displayed by the LSE sample 
dataset (largest LSE operators) which performs considerably worse than all other 
groups. 
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 Though it is evident that the NYSE sample is generally reflective of the trends displayed 
by the NYSE on the whole, there is a clear disparity between LSE sample and the LSE on the 
whole, particularly following 1997. This disparity is interpreted to occur as a consequence of the 
selection of the sample through market capitalization. The average current (as of December 2018) 
market capitalization of the CLaSLC LSE and NYSE datasets was roughly $880 million and $35 
billion respectively, while the average IPO date was 2004 and 1990 respectively. From the 
disparity in the trends shown in Figure 1 and this information regarding the datasets it is clear that 
the NYSE and LSE are significantly different markets (this is also introduces potential limitations 
to the study method (see Section 5.4)). The NYSE on the whole is a much larger and more 
developed capital market, having a total market capitalization of approximately $3 trillion in the 
oil and gas sector compared to roughly $800 billion on the LSE. NYSE listed companies tend to 
be more mature and financially stable in comparison to the trend displayed by the younger 
operators listed on the LSE. Consequently, in selecting the largest 20 LSE listed operators by 
market capitalization this technique has sampled companies which are more mature and financially 
stable than the average company on the LSE. In contrast, NYSE listed companies are generally 
more mature and more financially stable than those listed on the LSE and therefore the sample of 
the 20 largest NYSE operators by market capitalization is more reflective of the NYSE market on 
the whole. That the LSE sample may not necessarily be representative of the general trend on the 
LSE is just one of the parameters not fully accounted for in this study. 
 
SECTION 3.2:  POPULATING THE DATASET FRAMEWORK  
Section 3.2.1:  Return on Equity and Return on Assets 
All publicly traded companies are bound by strict regulations regarding their reporting of 
economic performance metrics which are broadly available to the public. Return on Equity (ROA) 
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and Return on Assets (ROA) are calculable from annual and quarterly reports made available by 
each company, with the former representing Net Income (from the income statement) divided by 
Equity (from the balance sheet) and the latter representing Net Income divided by Assets (from 
the balance sheet) for the same reporting period. Both ROE and ROA are widely used throughout 
the financial services industry as key performance indicators for any company and therefore the 
ROE and ROA for companies listed on the NYSE and LSE are already calculated for any given 
financial period. Therefore, in the gathering of ROE and ROA data, from 1990 to 2017 for this 
study, all oil and gas producers and refiners on the NYSE and LSE (125 and 152 respectively) had 
this information pulled from the website “Macrotrends” and were accurate as of December 2018. 
However ROE and ROA are relatively easy to calculate, and the same information could be 
gathered from any number of websites which track the markets. The benefit of using Macrotrends 
is that its information storage period tends to be longer than its competitors so it is possible to track 
changes in ROE and ROA for up to twenty to thirty years for mature companies. Though the full 
analysis was only conducted on the 3 DLCs and 40 CLaSLCs (20 from both the LSE and NYSE) 
the ROE and ROA data were gathered in order to ensure that these datasets were either 
representative of the market as a whole or to shed light on the reasons behind any discrepancies in 
the sample dataset and the market from which the dataset was pulled (see Section 3.1.2). However, 
ROA was not included as part of the final methodology. 
Section 3.2.2:  Net Income and Regional Net Income 
Net Income and Regional Net Income values were sourced from annual company reports 
and 10-K reports filed with the SEC for the period 2000 through 2017 for every year for which the 
information was published (which means at least every year that the company has been public). 
Net income for any public company is published at the bottom of the income statement and is the 
result of amending the total revenue (otherwise known as sales) earned by the company to reflect 
its operating expenses, interest expense, taxation, depreciation and amortization. By taking the 
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total revenue and subtracting these five factors, the result is the Net Income of the company. 
Through using Net Income (which also factors into ROE and ROA; see Section 3.2.1) as an 
indicator of economic success, the intention was to ensure that all company activities were 
encompassed within these indicators (as opposed to metrics such as revenue and earnings before 
interest, taxation, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) which do not). In doing so, any 
expenses which occurred directly as a result of innovations and efficiencies to reduce emissions or 
any expenses attributed to the purchase of emissions allowances were inferred to be reflected 
within Net Income. 
In all cases, companies report the net income or loss for a given year on their annual income 
statement. Additionally, in most cases large companies also report their Net Income by geographic 
segment (i.e. the Regional Net Income that is attributable to the company’s operations specifically 
in Europe or the U.S.). This Regional Net Income encompasses income and expenses specifically 
attributed to the geographic segment and therefore made for an excellent economic indicator of 
economic success for the purposes of this study. However, in the case of small companies it is 
significantly less common to find Net Income published by geographic segment. Where all of a 
small company’s operations were focused within one region (in either Europe or the U.S.) then the 
value for Net Income was carried over as the company’s Regional Net Income. Where Net Income 
was not published by geographic segment, and the company operated across multiple regions, 
Regional Net Income was calculated as a proportion of the value for Total Net Income for the 
company based upon the reported revenues by geographic segment. Revenue by geographic 
segment was always available, even in the absence of Net Income by geographic segment. 
The use of regional revenue as an approximation for Regional Net Income is inherently 
limited in its approach and introduces considerable limitations into the method for this study. This 
approximation was used for one of the NYSE CLaSLCs, approximately three of the LSE CLaSLCs 
and none of the DLCs taken forward into the data analysis. By using this approximation, there are 
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regional differences in expenses, such as those introduced by the EU ETS that may be 
disproportionately over or under represented in resulting approximation for Regional Net Income. 
It is therefore plausible that in using this approximation the results of this study have been skewed. 
Section 3.2.3:  Emissions and Regional Emissions 
Sources of Emissions in the Oil and Gas Sector 
Within the oil and gas industry there are a number of operations from which greenhouse 
gas emissions can be produced. Integrated oil and gas companies have both significant upstream 
(exploration and production) and downstream (refining and chemicals) components which are 
responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Therefore, in extrapolating regional emissions 
it is key to consider the geographic distribution of these operations so as best to account for the 
regional distribution of emissions for the integrated company. Shell (2018) note that: 
“In 2017, around 50% of our direct GHG emissions came from our refineries and 
chemical plants. The production of oil, gas and GTL products accounted for around 45% 
of our GHG emissions, and our shipping activities accounted for around 2%.” 
In comparison, ExxonMobil identify an approximate split of 55% of emissions from 
downstream and refining operations and 45% of emissions from upstream activities (ExxonMobil, 
2018). Therefore, for integrated oil companies a rough approximation of 50% of emissions from 
upstream and 50% of emissions from downstream was carried forward into the Regional Activity 
Conversion Factor (RACF) calculation; however for companies not listed as integrated the 
weighting was 100% on the upstream (production) side (see below).     
Gathering Company Total Emissions Data 
Emissions data proved considerably more challenging to find than for the economic 
indicators of success. Though most large companies now record and report emissions by gas type, 
this trend was not pervasive prior to 2005-2006 and remains less consistent for small cap 
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companies even in 2017. Carbon dioxide emissions across the entire company were typically the 
most widely reported across all companies, with 12 of the 20 NYSE listed CLaSLCs and 8 of the 
20 LSE listed CLaSLCs reporting data across years spanning multiple phases of the EU ETS. 
Detailed carbon dioxide emissions data were also reported by all 3 DLCs (BP, Shell and Total). 
Methane and nitrous oxide emissions proved less well reported than for carbon dioxide however 
it was still possible to generate datasets for both emissions types. All 3 DLCs reported methane 
and nitrous oxide emissions across the whole company for the same periods in which carbon 
dioxide emissions were reported. Whereas ten NYSE listed CLaSLCs and four LSE listed 
CLaSLCs and nine NYSE listed CLaSLCs and five LSE listed CLaSLCs reported annualized data 
for total company nitrous oxide and methane emissions, respectively. 
Extrapolating Company Regional Emissions from Gathered Total Emissions Data 
No companies report annual emissions by geographic segment. Therefore, the RACF was 
developed and used to convert the total annual company emissions into regional emissions which 
were reflective of the given company’s operations within a specific region (either in Europe or in 
the U.S. in the case of this analysis).  
The formula for calculating the RACF was dependent upon whether the company in 
question was integrated or focused mainly on upstream operations and the availability of data. In 
the case of producers the formula was as follows: 
 
Equation 2: 
𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑃 =
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇
 
 
The formula for calculating the RACF for integrated producers was as follows: 
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Equation 3: 
𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 0.5 ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇
+  0.5 ∗
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇
 
 
𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑃 = 𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑝𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 
𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐹𝐼 = 𝑅𝐴𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 (𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑈. 𝑆. ) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑅 = 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 (𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑈. 𝑆. ) 
𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
In the case of certain integrated companies downstream information was not published by 
geographic segment. These include Hess and Chevron. In these cases, where data were not 
available to calculate RACFI (see Equation 3) the RACF was calculated as if these integrated 
companies were producers (see Equation 2).  
Through utilizing this method the intention was to account for both the production and 
refining processes monitored by the EU ETS and the processes which account for the emission of 
greenhouse gases within the oil and gas sector (see previous paragraph within this Section). In the 
case of DLCs, a RACF was assigned for both Europe and the U.S. in order to conduct comparable 
analysis between both regions for all three companies. Whereas CLaSLCs received a single RACF 
dependent on whether they were listed on the NYSE and based in the U.S., hence were given a 
U.S. RACF, or listed on the LSE and based in Europe, hence were given a Europe RACF. Upon 
calculation of the RACF for each company annually, the total company annual emissions recorded 
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from company reports were multiplied by this RACF to produce an approximation for regional 
emissions from each gas type. 
 
SECTION 3.3:  PRIMARY DATA ANALYSES  
Section 3.3.1:  Overall Correlation between Economic Performance and Emissions 
Early stage analysis focused on the correlation between three indicators of economic 
success (ROE, Annual Rate of Change in Total Net Income and Annual Rate of Change in 
Regional Net Income) (see Section 3.2) and the annual rate of change in total and regional 
company emissions over the course of the analysis period 2000-2017. All correlation coefficients 
were calculated for each DLC and CLaSLC across the analysis period for carbon dioxide, nitrous 
oxide and methane, with two coefficients calculated for each gas for each DLC (one for the Europe 
region and one for the U.S.). However, correlations were not calculated using ROE or Total Net 
Income for DLCs as these values are the same across the entire company; the only difference for 
DLCs is reflected in regional emissions and Regional Net Income. The coefficients from this 
analysis address the hypothesis that the overall correlations between economic performance and 
the annual rate of change in the emissions of monitored gases over the course of the EU ETS 
(2005-2017) will be more negative for European operators than for U.S. operators (see Section 
2.2). 
Section 3.3.2:  Incremental Correlation between Economic Performance and Emissions 
The same process as described above was repeated incrementally for each company across 
each phase of the EU ETS (see Section 1.2.1), and a 4 year period prior to its initiation. This was 
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conducted in order to address the hypothesis that the incremental correlations between economic 
performance and annual rate of change in the emissions of monitored gases will become 
increasingly negative through each phase of the EU ETS for European operators while there should 
be little change for U.S. operators (see Section 2.2). 
 
SECTION 3.4:  SUPPORTING DATA ANALYSES  
Section 3.4.1:  T-Tests on Overall Correlations 
One tailed t-tests were conducted on the sets of correlations between each indicator of 
economic success and each emission type calculated as part of the analysis discussed in Section 
3.3.1. In testing the hypothesis that the overall correlations between economic performance and 
the annual rate of change in the emissions of monitored gases over the course of the EU ETS 
(2005-2017) will be more negative for European operators than for U.S. operators, it was 
imperative to ensure that the European and U.S. results could be differentiated with statistical 
significance. Working under the hypothesis that the correlation coefficients should be more 
negative for European than U.S. operators, one tailed t-tests were interpreted to be the most 
efficient way of identifying the degree of significance for which this could be concluded. 
Consistent with the hypothesis: 
• European DLCs and CLaSLCs will display a more negative correlation coefficient 
between the annual change in carbon dioxide emissions and indicators of economic 
success than their U.S. counterparts with a high degree of statistical significance. 
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• European DLCs and CLaSLCs will display a more negative correlation coefficient 
between the annual change in nitrous oxide emissions and indicators of economic 
success than their U.S. counterparts with a moderate to high degree of statistical 
significance. The disparity between European and U.S. correlation coefficients 
should be less for nitrous oxide than for carbon dioxide given its later inclusion 
within the scheme. 
• European DLCs and CLaSLCs will not display a correlation coefficient between 
the annual change in methane emissions and indicators of economic success that is 
different than their U.S. counterparts with any statistical significance given that the 
EU ETS does not reference methane emissions explicitly. 
One tailed t-tests were used as the hypotheses to be tested reflect an expected relationship: 
that European operators should have more negative correlations between their annual change in 
monitored emissions and economic success than their U.S. counterparts. However, given the 
minimal number of years within each phase of the EU ETS, and therefore the limited availability 
of data points within each phase, t-tests were only conducted on overall correlations, which span 
the entirety of the EU ETS, and not on incremental correlations. 
  
 40 
Chapter 4:  Results 
 
SECTION 4.1:  RESULTS OF PRIMARY ANALYSIS   
Section 4.1.1:  Overall Correlation between Economic Performance and Emissions 
Across the entirety of the analysis period 2000 through 2017 it is clear that there is little 
disparity in the economic performance exhibited by European DLCs and CLaSLCs and their U.S. 
counterparts, less so than was postulated in Section 2 (see Appendix A for raw data, Appendix B 
for correlation coefficients and Appendix C for plots of raw emissions data).  
As noted in Section 2.2, companies, or portions of DLCs, operating within the jurisdiction 
of the EU ETS were hypothesized to have an overall more negative correlation between ROE and 
Total Net Income and total annual carbon dioxide emissions and between Regional Net Income 
and carbon dioxide emissions than U.S. companies. This did not prove to be the case, particularly 
in the case of CLaSLCs (see Appendix B.3). Similarly, companies, or portions of DLCs, operating 
within the jurisdiction of the EU ETS were hypothesized to have an overall more negative 
correlation between economic performance and nitrous oxide emissions. This trend was more 
pronounced in the CLaSLC datasets compared with DLCs. Additionally, the annual change in 
methane emissions showed the strongest negative correlation with European economic 
performance (contrary to the hypothesis stated in Section 2.2). Again, this trend was most 
prominent for CLaSLCs, but was also present for DLCs (see Appendix B.3). 
By considering the raw data plotted in Appendix C alongside the total correlation 
coefficients between emissions and economic performance (see Appendix B.3) it is possible to 
better interpret the overall correlations identified. With regards to DLCs, emissions of nitrous 
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oxide and methane were dropping significantly prior to the introduction of the EU ETS in 2005 
and then stagnated through the 2005 to 2017 period. Carbon dioxide emissions decreased steadily 
over the 2000 to 2017 period for DLCs though generally at a slower rate after the introduction of 
the EU ETS in 2005. The stabilizing of DLC emissions through the 2005 to 2017 period aligns 
with the broad trend recorded in Figure 2.1, lending credit to the interpretation that the European 
segment of DLCs may have suffered poorer economic performance, resultant from penalties 
incurred from exceeding allowances, partly as a result of a failure to further reduce monitored 
emissions in Europe. However, this is not apparent within the correlations noted for the European 
segments of DLCs versus their U.S. counterparts across the entirety of the EU ETS. Additionally, 
European and U.S. CLaSLCs also do not display a significant reduction in monitored emissions 
across the EU ETS period (2005 to 2017). However, European CLaSLCs weakly display a more 
negative correlation between regional net income and regional carbon dioxide emissions than their 
U.S. equivalents. The lack of significant reductions in monitored emissions over the course of 
2005 to 2017 in both CLaSLC datasets (see Figures C.4 through C.9) and the more negative 
correlation between carbon dioxide emissions and economic performance for European CLaSLCs 
suggests that this may due to a flattening of annual emissions and poor economic performance. 
Section 4.1.2:  Temporal Variation in the Correlations between Economic Performance and 
Emissions 
The incremental correlations (see Section 3.3.2) calculated generally followed a similar 
trend as the overall correlations noted in Section 4.1.1. However, an increasingly negative 
correlation between carbon dioxide emissions and economic performance was not present within 
either of the European datasets (see Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The correlation between 
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economic performance and the annual change in nitrous oxide emissions was also inconsistent 
with that hypothesized in Section 2.2 for both DLCs and CLaSLCs. From Phase II onward the 
correlation coefficient for European operators becomes increasingly negative relative to their U.S. 
counterparts (see Figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8), supporting the hypothesis of this study. Incremental 
correlations between the annual change in methane emissions and economic performance showed 
the greatest initial variation within U.S. and European datasets. European CLaSLCs show an 
increasingly negative correlation between economic performance and methane emissions (as did 
U.S. DLCs). However European portions of DLCs and U.S. CLaSLCs did not generally display a 
consistent temporal trend in the correlation between methane emissions and economic 
performance (see Figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.21 and 4.12). The incremental correlations for methane 
broadly support the hypothesis of Section 2.2 that the correlations between methane emissions and 
economic performance would be similar for U.S. and European operators. However, the 
conclusion is similar for carbon dioxide, with nitrous oxide being the only monitored emissions to 
fit the incremental hypothesis made in Section 2.  
The increasingly negative correlation between nitrous oxide emissions and regional 
economic performance for European operators after Phase II of the EU ETS is associated with no 
clear reduction in nitrous oxide emissions (see Appendix C). This suggests that an increasingly 
negative correlation between emissions and economic performance is the result of decreasing 
economic performance. This increasingly negative correlation is therefore interpreted to be the 
result of stable nitrous oxide emissions (apart from Cairn Energy) and poorer economic 
performance. Carbon dioxide and methane emissions also do not show a clear reduction over the 
course of the EU ETS however, an increasingly negative correlation between European operators’ 
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regional economic performance and their carbon dioxide and methane emissions versus their U.S. 
counterparts is not as apparent as for nitrous oxide. It is inferred that this may partly be a result of 
methane’s lack of inclusion under the scope of the EU ETS and therefore relatively stable methane 
emissions are not subject to increasing penalty under the scheme. In turn this does not result in 
decreased economic performance and therefore would not result in an increasingly negative 
correlation between regional methane emissions and regional economic performance in Europe.
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Figure 4.1: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2000 through 2004 for carbon dioxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note that a lack of data during the 2000 to 2004 period (prior to the EU ETS) does not 
allow for robust inferences 
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Figure 4.2: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2000 through 2004 for carbon dioxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note a higher proportion of U.S. companies with a negative correlation between 
regional carbon dioxide emissions and economic performance. 
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Figure 4.3: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2008 through 2012 for carbon dioxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note a higher proportion of U.S. companies with a negative correlation between 
regional carbon dioxide emissions and economic performance.  
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Figure 4.4: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2013 through 2017 for carbon dioxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note again a higher proportion of U.S. companies with a negative correlation between 
regional carbon dioxide emissions and economic performance. 
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Figure 4.5: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2000 through 2004 for nitrous oxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note that a lack of data during the 2000 to 2004 period (prior to the EU ETS) does not 
allow for robust inferences. 
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Figure 4.6: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2005 through 2007 for nitrous oxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note a greater proportion of European. companies with a negative correlation between 
regional nitrous oxide emissions and regional economic performance prior to the monitoring of nitrous oxide by 
the EU ETS. 
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Figure 4.7: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2008 through 2012 for nitrous oxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note a greater proportion of U.S. companies with a negative correlation between 
regional nitrous oxide emissions and regional economic performance during the first phase of the monitoring of 
nitrous oxide by the EU ETS. 
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Figure 4.8: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2013 through 2017 for nitrous oxide emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note that over time a greater proportion of European companies now have a negative 
correlation between regional nitrous oxide emissions and regional economic performance. 
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Figure 4.9: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2000 through 2004 for methane emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note that a lack of data during the 2000 to 2004 period (prior to the EU ETS) does not 
allow for robust inferences, though European operators show a more significant negative correlation between 
methane emissions and regional net income.  
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Figure 4.10: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2005 through 2007 for methane emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note a relatively even proportion of European and U.S. companies with a negative 
correlation between regional methane emissions and regional economic performance. Methane is unmonitored 
during Phase I of the EU ETS. 
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Figure 4.11: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2008 through 2012 for methane emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note a relatively even proportion of European and U.S. companies with a negative 
correlation between regional methane emissions and regional economic performance. Methane is unmonitored 
during Phase II of the EU ETS. 
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Figure 4.12: Correlation coefficients for all data sets for the period 2103 through 2017 for methane emissions against 
economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income). See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables 
of correlation coefficients. Note the relatively even proportion of European and U.S. companies with a negative 
correlation between regional methane emissions and regional economic performance. Methane is unmonitored 
during Phase III of the EU ETS.
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SECTION 4.2:  RESULTS OF SUPPORTING ANALYSIS   
Section 4.2.1:  T-Tests on Overall Correlations 
The t-test was used to assess the statistical significance of the overall correlations 
between emissions and economic performance for European versus U.S. operators (see 
Section 3.4). Through utilizing one-tailed t-tests the intention was to identify whether the 
correlations between economic performance and annual changes in emissions were more 
negative for operators under the EU ETS than their equivalents outside of the scheme (the 
U.S. comparison groups).  
T-tests generate p-values between 0 and 1, based on the degree of statistical 
significance that two sample groups are statistically different, in this case whether 
European datasets show more negative correlations between economic performance and 
annual changes in emissions than their U.S. equivalents. The p-value generated is reflective 
of the degree of confidence with which the hypothesis can be affirmed. T-tests were 
conducted on the European portion of DLCs versus the U.S. portion of DLCs and European 
CLaSLCs versus U.S. CLaSLCs with the results displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Correlations between the Regional Net Income and methane emissions for CLaSLCs 
proved the most statistically different between European and U.S. operators, with 98% 
confidence (the same was true for DLCs at 88% confidence). Additionally, a statistical 
difference between Regional Net Income and regional nitrous oxide emissions was 
concluded with 88% confidence for European versus U.S. CLaSLCs.  
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 ROE Total Net Income Regional Net Income 
Carbon Dioxide N/A N/A 0.35 
Nitrous Oxide N/A N/A 0.50 
Methane N/A N/A 0.12 
Table 4.1: P-values for t-tests conducted on correlation between emissions (in left 
column) and indicators of economic performance (in top row) for European 
versus U.S. portions of DLCs. Note the p-value of 0.12 suggesting with 88% 
confidence that European portions of DLCs display a more negative 
correlation between regional methane emissions and regional net income 
than their U.S. counterparts. 
 
 ROE Total Net Income Regional Net Income 
Carbon Dioxide 0.46 0.32 0.12 
Nitrous Oxide 0.16 0.32 0.31 
Methane 0.21 0.16 0.02 
Table 4.2: P-values for t-tests conducted on correlation between emissions (in left 
column) and indicators of economic performance (in top row) for European 
versus U.S. CLaSLCs. Note the p-value of 0.12 suggesting with 88% 
confidence that European CLaSLCs display a more negative correlation 
between regional nitrous oxide emissions and regional net income than their 
U.S. counterparts. Also note the p-value of 0.02 suggesting with 98% 
confidence that European CLaSLCs display a more negative correlation 
between regional nitrous oxide emissions and regional net income than their 
U.S. counterparts. 
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Chapter 5:  Discussion 
 
SECTION 5.1:  SUMMARY OF KEY RESULTS   
From the results addressed in Section 4 it is apparent that there are some statistical 
differences in the correlations between economic performance and annual changes  in 
gaseous emissions for oil and gas producers and refiners operating under the jurisdiction 
of the EU ETS compared with those operators which are not subject to this jurisdiction. 
Section 1 outlined the basic premise of the EU ETS: to encourage a reduction in emissions 
without significantly damaging the economic performance of operators under the purview 
of the scheme (Convery, 2009; Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009). Results presented in 
Section 4 infer that oil and gas producers and refiners under the EU ETS typically 
experience poorer economic performance, an approximately 7% poorer ROE than the 
NYSE dataset, however presently it remains unclear as to whether these differences are the 
direct result of a stagnation of European operator emissions and a lowering of EU ETS 
emissions allowances (see Figure 3.1) or they occurred as result of external factors (see 
Sections 2.3 and 5.2).  
Trends in carbon dioxide emissions did not reflect those hypothesized, supporting 
the existence of these external factors. Overall correlations between the annual rates of 
change in carbon dioxide emissions and economic performance did not generally show a 
more negative trend for European operators than their U.S. counterparts (see Figures 5.1 
and 5.2).  
 59 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Correlation coefficients of total/regional carbon dioxide emissions against 
total/regional net income for DLCs. See Section 3.3.1 for description of the 
method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography for list of the raw 
data sources. Note that there is very little to distinguish the trends displayed 
by European and U.S. portions of DLCs. 
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Figure 5.2: Correlation coefficients of total/regional carbon dioxide emissions against 
total/regional net income for CLaSLCs. See Section 3.3.1 for description of 
the method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography for list of the 
raw data sources. Note that, again there is little to distinguish European 
operators from their U.S. counterparts. 
European segments of DLCs (n=3) and European CLaSLCs (n=6) also failed to 
show an increasingly negative correlation between regional carbon dioxide emissions and 
regional net income between Phase I and Phase III of the EU ETS relative to their U.S. 
counterparts (see Figure 5.3). U.S. operators also failed to show any significant trend in the 
correlations observed. Such a trend may result from the influence of external 
macroeconomic and commodity price factors which are not exclusive to the EU ETS (see 
Section 5.3) affecting the results. This is perhaps the reason for such insignificant statistical 
differences noted in Section 4.2 (see Section 3.4.1 and Section 4.2.1 for associated method 
and results). In all cases, results for carbon dioxide emissions therefore did not meet the 
initial hypothesis therefore inferring that global factors, external from the EU ETS may 
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likely drive the trends noted in the correlations between economic performance and carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
 
Figure 5.3: Average correlations between rates of change in regional net income and 
regional annual carbon dioxide emissions by phase of the EU ETS for 
European and U.S. CLaSLCs and the European and U.S. segments of DLCs. 
See Section 3.3.2 for description of the method behind this figure and Part 2 
of the Bibliography for list of the raw data sources. Note that from Phase I 
onward, only U.S. CLaSLCs display an increasingly negative correlation. 
Results for nitrous oxide emissions proved more conclusive than for carbon dioxide 
but were still generally insignificant. Overall correlations for the 2005-2017 conclude that, 
with 88% confidence, European CLaSLCs have a more negative correlation between 
economic performance and nitrous oxide emissions (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5). However, 
this is statistically insignificant. While incremental correlations (through each phase of the 
EU ETS) showed an increasingly negative correlation between nitrous oxide emissions and 
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economic performance from Phase II of the EU ETS onward for European DLCs and 
CLaSLCs, though this trend was also present weakly within the U.S. CLaSLC dataset (see 
Figure 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.4: Correlation coefficients of total/regional nitrous oxide emissions against 
total/regional net income for DLCs. See Section 3.3.1 for description of the 
method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography for list of the raw 
data sources. Note that there is no clear difference in the correlations 
between nitrous oxide emissions and economic performance for the 
European versus the U.S. segments of DLCs. 
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Figure 5.5: Correlation coefficients of total/regional nitrous oxide emissions against 
total/regional net income for CLaSLCs. See Section 3.3.1 for description of 
the method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography for list of the 
raw data sources. Note that there is no significant difference in the 
correlations between nitrous oxide emissions and economic performance for 
European CLaSLCs versus their U.S. counterparts. 
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Figure 5.6: Average correlations between regional net income and regional nitrous 
oxide emissions by phase of the EU ETS for European and U.S. CLaSLCs 
and the European and U.S. segments of DLCs. See Section 3.3.2 for 
description of the method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography 
for list of the raw data sources. Note that from Phase II onward, the 
correlation between regional net income and nitrous oxide emissions trends 
generally more negative for European datasets versus their U.S. 
counterparts. 
Given that methane emissions are not explicitly addressed by the EU ETS it was 
hypothesized that European and U.S. datasets would not display the difference in trends 
exhibited by the other emissions (see Section 2.2). It was therefore anticipated that trends 
exhibited with regards to methane would be more similar between European and U.S. 
datasets than for carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide. However this was not the case. 
European CLaSLCs showed a considerably more negative correlation between annual rate 
of change in methane emissions and economic performance than their U.S. counterparts, 
with 98% confidence; although results from DLCs were more aligned to the initial 
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hypothesis (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8). Incremental correlations generally aligned with the 
initial hypothesis (see Section 2.2 and Figure 5.9). The incremental trend between regional 
economic performance and regional methane emissions did not follow a conclusive trend 
for the European versus U.S. company datasets and therefore were generally consistent 
with the initial hypothesis (see Section 2.2). The disparity in the overall correlations 
between economic performance and methane emissions for DLCs raises questions as to 
whether the method employed accounts for additional factors related to economic 
performance and emissions in the oil and gas sector (see Section 5.3).   
 
Figure 5.7: Correlation coefficients of total/regional methane emissions against 
total/regional net income for DLCs. See Section 3.3.1 for description of the 
method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography for list of the raw 
data sources. Note that there is little to distinguish the European from U.S. 
trend. 
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Figure 5.8: Correlation coefficients of total/regional methane emissions against 
total/regional net income for CLaSLCs. See Section 3.3.1 for description of 
the method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography for list of the 
raw data sources. Note that there is no clear difference in the correlations 
between methane emissions and economic performance for European 
CLaSLCs versus their U.S. counterparts though statistically there appears to 
be some difference. 
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Figure 5.9: Average correlations between regional net income and regional methane 
emissions by phase of the EU ETS for European and U.S. CLaSLCs and the 
European and U.S. segments of DLCs. See Section 3.3.2 for description of 
the method behind this figure and Part 2 of the Bibliography for list of the 
raw data sources. Note that there is no discernable difference in the trends 
displayed in the European versus U.S. datasets during after Phase I of the 
EU ETS. 
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Section 5.2.1: The EU ETS’ Encouragement of Emissions Reductions and Economic 
Growth   
Section 1.2 briefly discussed the effectiveness of the EU ETS with particular 
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perception that the EU ETS has not been successful in achieving its goal of encouraging 
innovation and efficiency to reduce emissions while facilitating economic growth 
(Convery 2009; Skjaerseth, 2014; OECD, 2018) (see Sections 1.1 and 1.2). However, 
questions remain about whether there is still hope for the scheme to achieve its goals in the 
long run (de Perthuis, 2011, Koch et al., 2016).  
As part of the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), 
Muntean et al. (2018) recorded carbon dioxide intensity (emissions per unit of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in U.S. dollars) for every country across the world (see Figure 
5.10).  
 
Figure 5.10: Temporal variation in carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP (US$) by 
Country or Group. Data adapted from Muntean et al. (2018). Note that after 
the introduction of the EU ETS the U.S. outpaces the EU in its reduction of 
emissions intensity by a small amount. 
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    From Figure 5.10, it is apparent that, although the EU has lesser carbon dioxide 
emissions per unit of GDP, the U.S. is reducing its carbon dioxide intensity at a faster rate 
than the EU. Given that the intention of the EU ETS was to reduce emissions and encourage 
economic growth (Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009) it is therefore surprising that the EU 
does not outpace the U.S. in this particular aspect, though this could be the result of starting 
with a lower original emissions intensity. Analysis conducted on Muntean et al.’s (2018) 
data for the purposes of this study suggests that the EU’s rate of reduction in carbon 
intensity decreased following the initiation of the EU ETS in 2005; though this was also 
true for the U.S. (see Table 5.1). 
 
Country/Group Prior to the EU ETS During the EU ETS 
United States -0.010 -0.009 
European Union -0.007 -0.006 
Table 5.1: Rate of change for the United States’ and European Union’s carbon dioxide 
emissions intensity before and during the EU ETS; 1990 to 2005 and 2005 
to 2017 respectively. Rate of change calculated from the slope of the line of 
best fit for each curve. Data adapted from Muntean et al. (2018). Note the 
faster rate of change for the U.S. versus the EU during the EU ETS. 
 From the disparity in the rates of change recorded in Table 5.1 it is clear that there 
is a degree of uncertainty as to whether the EU ETS has thus far been successful in 
achieving its goal to reduce emissions and promote economic growth. The analysis 
conducted on the oil and gas sector during this study also infers such a conclusion, but that 
the occurrence of external factors likely exerts greater influence on the oil and gas sector 
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than the scheme itself (see Section 5.3). It is apparent that oil and gas operators in Europe 
have performed worse economically than their U.S. counterparts and it is possible that 
allowance and penalty payments as a result of the EU ETS have contributed to this poorer 
performance, though this cannot be confirmed from the results in Section 4. It is also 
acknowledged that there are a number of external factors which may have also significantly 
influenced the results (see Section 5.3).  
 This conclusion also aligns with the data produced by Kortelainen (2018) and 
conclusions inferred from the work of the OECD (2018). Kortelainen (2018) noted a 17.5% 
decrease in total emissions for the 2005-2017 period across all sectors monitored by the 
EU ETS. However, this overall decrease was strongly influenced by considerable 
reductions in the power and heat and lime and cement production sectors. Emissions in the 
oil and gas sector were not reduced in the period between 2005 and 2017, despite a 
significant decrease in the total emissions allocated to the sector by the EU ETS (see Figure 
2.1). The discrepancy between the rapid reductions in emissions allowances in Phase III of 
the EU ETS and the actions by operators to reduce their verified emissions (see Figure 2.1) 
is interpreted to be partly responsible for the poor economic performance of European 
operators relative to their U.S. counterparts. By comparing Figures 2.1 and 2.2 it is clear 
that there is a relationship between a reduction in the allowances made to the oil and gas 
sector (reflective of reductions made across all sectors of the EU ETS at this time) and a 
propensity for monitored sectors in general, including the oil and gas sector, to increasingly 
be in exceedance of their emissions allowances. Associated with this exceedance of 
emissions allowances are financial penalties imposed by the EU ETS. However, the OECD 
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(2018) also note a general decrease in carbon dioxide emissions intensity for the oil and 
gas sector between 2005 and 2017. 
 The imposition of such financial penalties, in the range of 100 euros per metric ton 
of emissions above the annual allowance (European Commission, 2019a), were intended 
to encourage the efficiencies, innovation and growth outlined under the initial proposition 
of the scheme (Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2009). However, it appears from the results 
outlined by Convery (2009), de Perthuis (2011), Kortelainen (2018), Muntean et al. (2018) 
and the OECD (2018) that the intention of such penalties is not reflected in reality. One 
potential explanation is that operators in Europe have generally not made a significant 
attempt to reduce their annual emissions of monitored gases and therefore are in 
exceedance of reduced allowances for which in they are subject to financial penalties. 
Although an alternative is that there is simply a long lag time between their actions to 
reduce emissions and the results of these actions. This may have contributed to their poorer 
economic performance under the EU ETS relative to their U.S. counterparts. However, this 
cannot be concluded from the results produced by this study. 
Section 5.2.2: The Use of Pricing versus Quantity Instruments 
As a quantity mechanism, emissions trading schemes are expected to offer greater 
control over monitored variables where information is asymmetrically distributed or there 
is considerable information uncertainty (Menanteau, Finon and Lamy, 2003). This 
condition characterizes emissions monitoring in the EU. Therefore, a successful EU ETS 
should offer greater control over emissions than carbon taxation and good control over 
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emissions quantities in general. However, it is apparent that this has not been the case but 
the reasons appear to be structural. For example, as discussed in Section 5.2.1, the penalties 
imposed have not been sufficiently severe so as to change operators’ practices with regard 
to emissions in the oil and gas sector, which is broadly reflective of similar shortcomings 
across all sectors of the scheme (see Section 1.3).  
When Weitzman (1974) first discussed quantity and pricing instruments for tying 
any given variable to economic performance he was not able to propose one method over 
the other in order to achieve optimal results. Weitzman (1974) suggested that quantity 
methods placed greater inherent value on control of the given variables while pricing 
methods were more economically efficient. Summers (2007) has since commented that 
extensive regulatory approaches are “more likely to be economically inefficient and 
regressive”. It appears that cap-and-trade in the context of the EU ETS has been 
economically inefficient and given the results of this study it is also apparent that the 
scheme has been regressive for the European oil and gas sector: oil and gas operators in 
Europe have performed poorer than their U.S. counterparts as a partial consequence of the 
EU ETS (see Section 5.2.1). Given conclusions within the literature broadly produce 
similar conclusions it is not surprising that U.S. favor trends toward the introduction of 
emissions taxation over cap-and-trade if either were to be adopted in this country. Though 
criticisms leveled at the EU ETS include an economically, as opposed to environmentally, 
focused approach (Reyes and Gilbertson, 2010; Webster, 2017) it would perhaps be more 
efficient to employ pricing mechanisms (emissions taxation) over quantity mechanisms 
(cap-and-trade) in the future given the results produced by the EU ETS. Weitzman (1974) 
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noted the strong early preference within the economic community for pricing mechanisms 
and it appears that the sentiment remains the same today. Given the complex and relatively 
recent implementation of widespread cap-and-trade schemes, there is at present, no 
conclusive evidence to strongly infer that pricing mechanisms are any more successful than 
quantity mechanisms (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Jung et al., 1996; Requate and Unold, 
2003; Andrew, 2008; Andersen and Greaker, 2018).   
 
SECTION 5.3:  ADDITIONAL FACTORS OF INFLUENCE   
Section 5.3.1: Unilateral Policies within EU Member States   
As mentioned in Section 1.2, Phase III of the EU ETS (from 2013 to the present) 
saw a shift from individual national allowances per sector to a single allowance for each 
sector across the entirety of the scheme (European Commission, 2019a). However, as 
apparent from the work of Skeates and Innes (2018) in Figure 1.2 there are a number of 
EU member states, including Germany, which have implemented their own emissions floor 
prices and taxes in addition to a number of unilateral environmental policies. In some cases, 
these unilateral policies may provide a more appealing environment for oil and gas 
operators while the opposite may be true in others. Therefore, these unilateral policy 
variations between member states may partially account for the results produced in this 
study.  
Skeates and Innes (2018) infer an equivalent cost of carbon on the EU ETS of $16 
per ton across Phase III of the scheme. However it is evident in Figure 1.2 that a number 
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of EU member states, including France, Norway and Sweden have unilateral policies with 
higher costs of carbon (in exceedance of $50 per ton). Given that the majority of the EU’s 
oil and gas production occurs in the North Sea, greater than 90% from the United Kingdom, 
Norway and Denmark (EU Offshore Authorities Group, 2019), the implementation of 
unilateral carbon floor prices greater than the allowance cost on the EU ETS in this region 
has likely exerted influence on the results of this study..  
Analysis of individual member states from the data provided by Muntean et al. 
(2018) supports the interpretation that there is unilateral variation within the EU, and by 
extension a variation in exposure to the EU ETS (see Table 5.2). This variation is most 
prominent in the large reduction of Spain’s rate of change and Germany’s stagnation, due 
potentially in part to Spain’s ambitious carbon policy and the rapid uptake of appropriate 
renewable projects in the country (Neslen, 2018). From examples such as this it is apparent 
that the policies of individual member states, particularly those responsible for the majority 
of oil and gas production, exert differing influence on the practices of emitters. Therefore, 
it is suggested that unilateral variation in policies specific to each member state may have 
accounted for results produced in this study which are not accounted for in the method 
utilized. 
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Table 5.2: Rate of change for the European Union’ and influential members states’ 
carbon dioxide emissions intensity before and during the EU ETS; 1990 to 
2005 and 2005 to 2017 respectively. Rate of change calculated from the 
slope of the line of best fit for each curve. Data adapted from Muntean et al. 
(2018). Note the wide variation in the rates of change of individual members 
of the EU. 
Section 5.3.2: Variation in Trends in Emissions and Costs per Barrel Produced   
It is also important to consider that not all oils (and gases) are produced under 
identical conditions. Each have greenhouse gas emissions and cost profiles associated with 
the blend and are distributed geographically as a function of the geology of the producing 
basin. In this way, some blends are simply more prone to higher emissions as a function of 
the processes involved in their production (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
2019). 
Gordon et al.’s (2015) index of thirty global oil blends identifies significant 
variation in the upstream, midstream and downstream processes associated with the 
production of petroleum products from each barrel. Gordon et al. (2015) highlight the 
nature of the chemistry of the oil and the production environment as the key drivers of 
Country Prior to the EU ETS During the EU ETS 
France -0.004 -0.004 
Germany -0.008 -0.004 
Spain 0.000 -0.007 
United Kingdom -0.010 -0.009 
European Union -0.007 -0.006 
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variation in the emissions produced associated with the upstream processes for each of the 
oils considered. Gordon et al. (2015) and Di Lullo et al. (2016) identify factors associated 
with the composition of the blend and location and depth of the reservoir as key drivers of 
both upstream and downstream emissions. Associated with the former is the gas content, 
the state of degradation and the water content of the oil while the latter two relate to the 
depth of the reservoir and the location of the well in an extreme environment (Gordon et 
al., 2015; Di Lullo et la., 2016). It is possible that these factors have influenced both the 
regional emissions and regional economic performance of the companies assessed as part 
of this study.  
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2019), blends 
produced in Europe and the U.S. have average upstream emissions profiles of 28 and 58 
kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent respectively per barrel produced (see Figure 5.11). 
This indicates that typically each barrel of oil produced under the purview of the EU ETS 
will have inherently lesser emissions associated with its production than the U.S. 
equivalent. It is therefore likely that the results of this study are subject to this influence. 
Given that European barrels have inherently lesser emissions associated with their 
production, it is inferred that this factor manifests as a more positive skew for European 
operators relative to their U.S. counterparts. Each barrel produced in Europe results in less 
emissions than the U.S. equivalent and therefore a lesser penalty under the EU ETS than 
would be applied if there were parity between the emissions profiles. As a consequence of 
the lesser emissions per European barrel produced it is therefore likely that if emissions 
per barrel were normalized across the two regions (Europe and the U.S.) European 
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operators would perform poorer economically, emitting more carbon dioxide and therefore 
subject to greater penalties under the EU ETS. There would therefore be a more 
pronounced difference in the results produced for European versus U.S. operators.  
 
Figure 5.11: Average emissions generated per barrel produced in Europe and the U.S. 
Data adapted from Gordon et al. (2015) and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (2019). Note lower emissions per barrel in Europe 
versus the U.S. 
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Consequently, the works of Gordon et al. (2015) and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (2019) confirm that factors not considered within the scope of this 
study have likely influenced its results. However, given that typical emissions per barrel 
are less for European operators there is likely a positive skew to European economic 
performance and therefore should operators be normalized to the same emissions per barrel 
the results of this study may more conclusively infer that the EU ETS has exerted a negative 
impact on European operators relative to their U.S. counterparts. However, it must be noted 
that the averages calculated from the Gordon et al’s (2015) and the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace’s (2019) data are skewed by the presence of California blends 
requiring steam flooding which creates high emissions profiles. By removing these blends, 
the U.S. upstream average decreases to 48 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent per 
barrel produced but this change is not sufficient to make upstream emissions intensity in 
the U.S. less than Europe. 
Furthermore, the cost associated with each barrel produced must be considered for 
each region, as the cost to produce per region has an impact on the economic performance 
of operators within different regions. A significantly higher cost to produce in Europe 
would result in poorer economic performance relative to the U.S., regardless of any 
involvement of the EU ETS. An example of such a difference in production costs would 
be the U.S. shale boom which helped to reduce emissions and allowed high volume cheap 
production. This event is independent and exogenous to the EU ETS and therefore exerted 
influence on the results noted. According to Rystad Energy (2016), the average upstream 
cost of the major producing fields in Europe (North Sea) is approximately $30 compared 
to $20 for the major fields in the U.S. (see Figure 5.12).  
Given the difference of roughly $10 per barrel between the producing regions the 
results of this thesis are, at least partially, influenced by differences in production costs 
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between Europe and the U.S. The more expensive production costs associated with 
European operations are reflected in decreased net income per barrel than in the U.S. which 
negatively impacts economic performance for European operators relative to their U.S. 
counterparts. It is therefore likely that poorer economic performance in Europe is partly a 
consequence of trends in production costs and not as a direct consequence of penalties and 
payments resulting from the EU ETS. This study did not take into account the influence of 
geographic variations in emissions and cost trends weakening the overall conclusions 
which potentially contributed to the inconclusive results generated (see Chapter 4). 
 
Figure 5.12: Average cost to produce from major fields in Europe and the United States. 
Data adapted from Rystad Energy (2016). Note a lower cost to produce in 
the U.S. 
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Section 5.3.3: Macroeconomic Events: The 2008 Financial Crisis 
The occurrence of significant macroeconomic events during the 2005 through 2017 
period has also likely exerted considerable influence on the results of this study. Figure 3.3 
showed median ROE across the LSE and NYSE on the whole and across the sample 
datasets analyzed as part of this study. From this figure (Figure 3.3) it is evident that the 
2008 financial crisis adversely affected the economic performance of operators across both 
exchanges, though the NYSE appears to have been impacted more significantly.  
 The 2008 financial crisis originated as a sub-prime mortgage crisis through 2007 
and finally becoming a global recession in December 2007 (Holt, 2009). Holt (2009) and 
Allen and Carletti (2010) point to generally low interest rates and overly positive market 
sentiment as the drivers of this financial crisis, factors which also affected the oil and gas 
sector at this time. Given that the origins of the financial crisis lie in the U.S. housing 
market (Holt, 2009; Allen and Carletti, 2010) it is not surprising that the NYSE was more 
significantly impacted than the LSE. However the ramifications of a significant reduction 
in the availability of U.S. capital were certainly felt by European operators (see Figure 3.3). 
Intuitively, the drying up of the international capital markets likely exerted a negative 
impact on the economic performance of oil and gas operators both in Europe and the U.S. 
However, the knock-on effects of low interest rates in the early 2000’s, and their associated 
increase through 2005-2009 also had a detrimental impact on operations. According to 
Boyte-White (2018), low interest rates reduce the cost of debt to fund companies and 
projects and their Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC).  
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By lowering WACC, the company’s discount rate is also generally lowered (unless 
a hurdle rate is used). Through this lowering of the discount rate, it is more common for 
companies to pursue riskier projects (those that are closer to breakeven) (Boyte-White, 
2018). In the years preceding the financial crisis (2000-2005), low interest rates likely 
encouraged the uptake of riskier projects by oil and gas operators and therefore exacerbated 
the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the economic performance of the operators 
analyzed in this study. Though it is challenging to quantify the precise impact of the 2008 
financial crisis on European versus U.S. operators, it is apparent that such a significant 
macroeconomic event exerted a strong negative influence on the economic performance of 
operators across the world and therefore likely influenced the results of this study. 
Section 5.3.4: Commodity Price Fluctuations 
A regional difference in commodity prices between Europe and the U.S. over the 
analysis period also likely exerted influence on the results of the study. Generally, the LSE 
sample dataset showed less correlation between the price of Brent crude than did the NYSE 
sample with the price of WTI crude (inferring that variations in commodity price may 
disproportionately affect the U.S. compared with the European oil and gas sector) (see 
Figures 5.13 and 5.14), while both exchanges showed a relatively similar correlation 
between ROE (economic performance) and Henry Hub prices (see Figure 5.15). 
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Figure 5.13: Median return on equity in the LSE sample and the price of Brent crude. 
Data adapted from Macrotrends (2018). Note a relatively strong correlation 
between ROE and oil price, excluding 2000 through 2008. 
 
Figure 5.14: Median return on equity in the NYSE sample and the price of WTI crude. 
Data adapted from Macrotrends (2018). Note a somewhat stronger 
correlation between ROE and oil price for the NYSE than the LSE sample. 
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Figure 5.15: Median return on equity in the LSE and NYSE sample and the price at 
Henry Hub. Data adapted from Macrotrends (2018). 
It is reasonable to assume that fluctuations in commodity price, especially the 
differential between Brent and WTI, have exerted at least a degree of influence on the 
economic performance of operators, most notably so during the 2014 oil price crash. Under 
the assumptions proposed by Weiner (1991) and expanded upon by Liu (2018), the oil 
market globalization assumption states that prices of crude oils of the same quality should 
be strongly correlated. With this assumption under consideration, Figures 5.13 and 5.14 
show similar trends in the prices of Brent and WTI, though the exact prices rarely align. 
Additionally, the occurrence of the oil price crash in 2014 (during Phase III of the EU ETS) 
likely exerted considerable negative impact on the economic performance of all companies, 
in addition to resulting in decreased production (and therefore decreased emissions). 
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Though it is challenging to quantify the impact of such a drastic crash, many economists 
cite the U.S. shale boom, resulting in increased supply, as a key driver of the crash 
(Samuelson, 2014). Consequently, it may be reasonable to infer that European operators 
were disproportionately negatively affected by this crash than their U.S. counterparts. If 
this is the case, then the 2014 price crash has likely exerted considerable influence on the 
overall and incremental correlations generated as part of this study. It is therefore important 
to acknowledge the role of commodity price fluctuations in the context of this study given 
that it is difficult to directly account for such fluctuations in the method. Lower production 
costs in the U.S. (see Figure 5.12)) and a potentially disproportionate exposure to the 2014 
oil price crash between regions may have exacerbated the negative economic performance 
relative to emissions for European operators compared with their U.S. counterparts. 
 
SECTION 5.4:  LIMITATIONS   
Section 5.4.1: General Limitations of the Thesis   
Though the method utilized in this study has been subject to refinement over the 
course of the analysis there remain many limitations and concerns with regards to the 
conclusions as discussed in the immediately preceding sections. In using market 
capitalization during initial sample selection the intention was to minimize the impact of 
company size on the results of the study. However, the total median market capitalization 
of companies in the oil and gas sector listed on the NYSE and LSE differ by a multiple of 
four, approximately $5B on the LSE compared with approximately $20B on the NYSE. 
This difference is in part reflective of a significantly younger average IPO age within the 
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LSE sample dataset (2004) compared with that of the NYSE dataset (1990) in addition to 
factors related to the state of development for each of these capital markets. The initial 
selection of 3 DLCs and 40 CLaSLCs across both the LSE and NYSE was intended to 
represent a statistically robust sample. However, due to a lack of emissions data the total 
number of companies studied comprehensively was closer to 20 than 40 as originally 
intended (though all 3 DLCs and 40 CLaSLCs had their economic performance recorded). 
This decrease in the size of the sampled datasets brings into question the reliability of the 
conclusions. There are also limitations associated with the regionalization of emissions and 
net income. In the case of emissions, this information was only available for companies on 
the whole and therefore the regional approximation was utilized (as described in Section 
3.2). Using a regional approximation which accounts for regional variations in production 
and refining was interpreted to be the best method in approximating regional emissions. 
However, a lack of data concerning regionalized refining throughput for integrated 
operators such as Hess and Andeavor limited the application of this method. Furthermore, 
the regional revenue approximation utilized for companies which did not publish net 
income by geographic segment fails to account for regional fiscal variations which are 
pertinent to analysis conducted under this study. Though the majority of companies 
sampled did not require this approximation, use of this approximation weakens the validity 
of the results for the 4 companies for which it was utilized. Furthermore, an inability to 
quantify the factors described in Section 5.3 also weakens the results of this study. In 
acknowledging and discussing the additional factors and limitations associated with this 
study and its method the intention is to ensure that this work is as transparent as possible.   
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Section 5.4.2: General Limitations of Event Studies   
The method outlined in this study roughly follows that of an event study as initially 
outlined in the landmark papers by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969). As such, 
it suffers from many of the limitations shared by numerous studies published since the 
method was initially suggested. Event studies typically focus on the impact of a specific 
event on the value of a firm, be it a macroeconomic event, regulatory change or company 
announcement (MacKinlay, 1997). In this case, the regulatory event was the introduction 
of the EU ETS. 
However, the method employed to study a continuous regulatory event, such as the 
EU ETS, introduces more uncertainty than when applied to a single event. MacKinlay 
(1997) noted the importance of event-date uncertainty as a limiting factor in the robustness 
of event studies. In conventional event studies, event-date uncertainty typically arises from 
an uncertainty pertaining to whether the market was informed prior to the recorded event-
date. For instance, if there was an information leak prior to an official announcement and 
the announcement date was taken as the event-date, then the disparity results in event-date 
uncertainty. With regards to this study, event-date does not refer to an uncertainty in the 
start date of the event (the beginning of 2005) but to the fact that given the continuous 
occurrence, and regulatory evolution, of the EU ETS it is challenging to define conclusive 
short term estimation windows associated with the event-date. For conventional event 
studies, event-date uncertainty allows for the interference of other factors not accounted 
for by the identified event-date. In this case, the EU ETS has run for over twelve years and 
is currently ongoing. Therefore, the comparable datasets analyzed throughout this study 
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may be subject to influences not accounted for in the methodology of this study, discussed 
previously in Section 5.3. 
 
SECTION 5.6:  FURTHER WORK   
From the work conducted under the scope of this study it is clear that further 
consideration is required both with regards to evaluating the efficacy of cap-and-trade 
schemes and the evaluation of oil and gas companies through an environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) lens. Both of these additional areas of study would significantly benefit 
from a standardized rubric for disclosing emissions data within the global oil and gas 
sector. At present, oil and gas companies operating under emissions trading schemes are 
required by law to record annualized emissions data for all three emissions types assessed 
within this study. However, these companies are not presently required to publish the 
recorded emissions in their 10-K statements or annual reports. Given the rapidly growing 
popularity of social and environmentally conscious investment funds and practices and the 
public nature of companies listed on any stock exchange, it should now fall within the 
fiduciary responsibility of oil and gas operators to allow common investors access to 
historic and current emissions data. Through the publication of such datasets it is suggested 
that the industry will be capable of achieving further transparency which in turn will be 
beneficial from both a public relations and financial performance standpoint. Such benefits 
may include the ability to evaluate operators on an historical emissions efficiency basis 
(see Figure 5.16) or in the ability to quantify investors’ ESG preferences (i.e. the premia 
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expected from investments made under an ESG portfolio relative to performance in 
environmental and social factors) through an establishment of ESG premiums for expected 
returns on equity. Additionally, wider publication of emissions data will allow for the 
development of more robust datasets than those constructed for the purposes of this study. 
In improving the robustness of the datasets used to analyze the efficacy of cap-and-trade 
policy and carbon taxation it is suggested that in the future it may be possible to empirically 
conclude what factors have a more tangible effect on greenhouse gas emissions. As the 
uptake of carbon taxation and cap-and-trade schemes is gaining more traction globally, the 
introduction of further, robustly populated, datasets will contribute to a more robust 
argument, in favor of either quantity or pricing mechanisms with regards to carbon policy.  
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 Figure 5.16: Production intensity with regards to carbon dioxide emissions for the three 
DLCs and two largest CLaSLCs. Note that over the course of the analysis 
production intensity has not significantly decreased for any of the five 
companies. 
SECTION 5.7:  CONCLUSIONS 
This study has attempted to address the impact of the EU ETS on the oil and gas 
sector in Europe. In doing so, it has addressed the broad hypothesis that oil and gas 
companies under the EU ETS would have a more negative overall, and increasingly 
negative through time, correlation between economic performance and emissions 
monitored by the scheme. This has been addressed through an adapted event study 
methodology, concluding that the EU ETS may have potentially impacted European 
operators negatively with regards to economic performance in comparison with their U.S. 
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counterparts while acknowledging many other factors not studied were likely greater 
contributors.  
Results from this study proved statistically inconclusive as to whether the EU ETS 
has exerted influence on the negative economic performance of European oil and gas 
companies relative to their U.S. counterparts. Therefore, it is plausible that the scheme may 
have played a part, through its imposition of allowances and penalties, in negatively 
impacting the economic performance of oil and gas companies operating within it. 
However, this cannot be concluded from the results of this study.  
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: LINKS TO RAW DATA 
Please click here to access and download the dataset built and analyzed during this 
study, available on Open Science Framework. Alternatively, access the supplemental 
materials provided with this document on the University of Texas Online Library. 
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APPENDIX B: OVERALL AND INCREMENTAL CORRELATIONS ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Appendix B.1:  Overall Correlation between Economic Performance and Emissions 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=18) 0.67 0.24 0.46 -0.29 
Total (n=8) 0.17 0.42 -0.88 0.10 
BP (n=18) 0.46 0.32 0.21 0.62 
Table B.1: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs. ROE 
and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide 
emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income analyzed against regional annual 
carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=15) 0.67 0.29 -0.12 
Chevron (n=16) -0.23 -0.10 -0.58 
ConocoPhillips (n=14) -0.13 .05 -0.52 
Occidental* (n=3) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Canadian Natural Resources (n=13) -0.54 -0.32 0.20 
Marathon Petroleum (n=11) 0.10 0.36 0.36 
Anadarko Petroleum (n=3) -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 
Andeavor (n=8) 0.15 0.13 0.13 
Hess (n=12) 0.40 0.26 -0.60 
Devon Energy* (n=3) -0.96 -0.99 -0.56 
Marathon Oil (n=8) -0.19 -0.20 -0.54 
Apache (n=6) 0.21 0.32 0.17 
Table B.2: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs. 
ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide 
emissions. U.S. Net Income analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide 
emissions. Perfect and near perfect correlations due to limited data 
availability (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=18) -0.23 0.31 0.13 
John Wood Group (Wood) (n=5) 0.79 0.78 0.73 
Tullow Oil (n=10) -0.20 -0.08 0.24 
Cairn Energy (n=18) 0.61 0.54 -0.41 
Premier Oil (n=14) -0.44 -0.31 -0.33 
Faroe Petroleum* (n=2) -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Enquest (n=5) -0.10 -0.11 -0.16 
Table B.3: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs. ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual carbon 
dioxide emissions. Europe Net Income analyzed against regional annual 
carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect and near perfect correlations due to 
limited data availability (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=18) 0.56 0.37 0.54 0.33 
Total (n=8) 0.69 0.59 0.33 0.26 
BP (n=13) 0.69 0.59 0.45 0.75 
Table B.4: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs. ROE 
and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. 
Europe and U.S. Net Income analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide 
emissions. 
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Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=16) 0.55 0.20 0.03 
Chevron (n=16) -0.66 -0.09 -0.31 
ConocoPhillips (n=15) 0.52 0.50 0.43 
Occidental* (n=3) 0.95 0.96 1.00 
Canadian Natural Resources (n=13) -0.41 -0.37 -0.06 
Pioneer Natural Resources* (n=2) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Andeavor (n=9) -0.73 -0.80 -0.80 
Hess (n=11) -0.50 -0.35 -0.75 
Marathon Oil (n=11) -0.59 -0.68 -0.69 
Apache (n=5) 0.12 0.19 0.17 
Table B.5: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs. 
ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide 
emissions. U.S. Net Income analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide 
emissions. Perfect and near perfect correlations due to limited data 
availability (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=18) -0.60 0.31 0.09 
Tullow Oil (n=6) 0.20 0.00 0.12 
Cairn Energy (n=18) 0.61 0.13 -0.56 
Premier Oil (n=8) 0.30 0.35 0.19 
Table B.6: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs. ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual nitrous 
oxide emissions. Europe Net Income analyzed against regional annual 
nitrous oxide emissions. 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=18) 0.44 0.01 -0.57 -0.72 
Total (n=8) 0.55 0.43 0.57 -0.05 
BP (n=18) 0.50 0.43 0.27 -0.57 
Table B.7: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs. ROE 
and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual methane emissions. 
Europe and U.S. Net Income analyzed against regional annual methane 
emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=11) -0.74 -0.54 -0.36 
Chevron (n=15) 0.11 0.25 -0.17 
ConocoPhillips (n=14) -0.06 -0.05 -0.34 
Occidental (n=3) 0.55 0.60 0.63 
Pioneer (n=3) -0.91 -0.87 -0.75 
Hess (n=13) -0.62 -0.50 -0.72 
Devon Energy* (n=3) -1.00 -1.00 -0.71 
Marathon Oil (n=6) 0.82 0.87 -0.33 
Apache (n=5) 0.90 0.80 0.65 
Table B.8: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs. 
ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual methane 
emissions. U.S. Net Income analyzed against regional annual methane 
emissions. Perfect and near perfect correlations due to limited data 
availability (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=18) 0.23 0.60 0.36 
Tullow Oil (n=10) 0.22 0.29 0.49 
Cairn Energy (n=18) 0.25 -0.10 -0.57 
Premier Oil (n=8) -0.10 -0.05 -0.13 
Enquest (n=5) 0.35 0.44 0.49 
Table B.9: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs. ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual 
methane emissions. Europe Net Income analyzed against regional annual 
methane emissions. 
Appendix B.2:  Incremental Correlation between Economic Performance and 
Emissions 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) 0.73 0.98 0.09 0.47 
BP* (n=5) 0.13 0.44 -1.00 0.65 
Table B.10: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs prior to 
the EU ETS (2000-2004). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total 
annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income analyzed 
against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect and near perfect 
correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis window (see 
asterisked companies). 
  
 97 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil* (n=2) 1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Chevron (n=3) -0.95 -0.05 -0.89 
Table B.11: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
prior to the EU ETS (2000-2004). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. U.S. Net Income analyzed 
against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect and near perfect 
correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis window (see 
asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) N/A -0.56 -0.79 
Cairn Energy (n=5) -0.51 -0.46 0.92 
Premier Oil* (n=2) -1.00 1.00 -1.00 
Table B.12: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Change in Total and Regional Net Income) for 
European CLaSLCs prior to the EU ETS (2000-2004). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect 
and near perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short 
analysis window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell* (n=3) 0.49 -0.72 -0.98 0.94 
BP (n=3) 0.66 -0.77 0.32 0.43 
Table B.13: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=3) 0.56 -0.22 0.28 
Chevron* (n=3) -0.25 0.72 0.99 
ConocoPhillips (n=3) -0.78 0.07 -0.41 
Canadian Natural Resources* (n=3) 0.90 0.99 0.31 
Hess* (n=2) -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Table B.14: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=3) N/A 0.89 0.57 
Cairn Energy (n=3) 0.24 0.28 -0.10 
Premier Oil* (n=3) 0.99 0.83 0.06 
Table B.15: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect 
and near perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short 
analysis window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) 0.76 0.86 0.54 -0.77 
Total* (n=3) 0.84 -0.89 0.94 -0.57 
BP (n=5) -0.43 -0.20 -0.47 0.39 
Table B.16: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=5) 0.46 0.49 -0.06 
Chevron (n=5) 0.43 -0.03 0.15 
ConocoPhillips (n=5) 0.90 0.91 -0.15 
Canadian Natural Resources (n=5) -0.83 -0.80 0.59 
Marathon Petroleum (n=5) -0.40 -0.38 -0.38 
Andeavor (n=3) -0.29 -0.48 -0.48 
Hess (n=5) 0.85 0.75 -0.16 
Marathon Oil* (n=3) -0.82 -0.96 0.49 
Table B.17: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) 0.32 0.40 0.42 
Tullow Oil (n=5) 0.33 0.79 0.40 
Cairn Energy* (n=5) 0.79 0.59 1.00 
Premier Oil* (n=5) -0.25 0.99 -0.63 
Table B.18: Correlation coefficients between annual rate of change in carbon dioxide 
emissions and economic performance (ROE and Annual Rates of Change in 
Total and Regional Net Income) for European CLaSLCs during Phase II of 
the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total 
annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe Net Income analyzed against 
regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect and near perfect 
correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis window (see 
asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) 0.88 0.85 0.58 -0.42 
Total (n=5) -0.18 0.35 -0.42 0.26 
BP (n=5) 0.91 0.78 0.76 0.63 
Table B.19: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. 
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Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=5) 0.19 0.16 0.15 
Chevron (n=5) 0.70 0.69 -0.60 
ConocoPhillips (n=5) 0.09 0.12 -0.48 
Occidental* (n=3) 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Canadian Natural Resources (n=5) -0.26 -0.27 0.10 
Marathon Petroleum (n=5) -0.33 -0.04 -0.04 
Anadarko Petroleum* (n=3) -0.23 -0.15 -0.09 
Andeavor (n=5) -0.42 -0.72 -0.72 
Hess (n=5) 0.60 0.46 -0.33 
Devon Energy* (n=3) -0.96 -0.99 -0.56 
Marathon Oil (n=5) 0.08 0.12 -0.71 
Apache (n=5) -0.28 -0.06 -0.36 
Table B.20: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) 0.33 0.67 0.53 
John Wood Group (Wood) (n=5) 0.79 0.78 0.73 
Tullow Oil (n=5) 0.23 0.21 -0.38 
Cairn Energy (n=5) 0.34 0.35 0.35 
Premier Oil (n=5) 0.43 0.56 0.22 
Faroe Petroleum* (n=2) -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
Enquest (n=5) 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 
Table B.21: Correlation coefficients between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual carbon dioxide emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual carbon dioxide emissions. Perfect 
and near perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short 
analysis window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) -0.84 0.05 0.72 -0.53 
BP* (n=5) 0.82 -1.00 -1.00 -0.54 
Table B.22: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs prior to 
the EU ETS (2000-2004). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total 
annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income analyzed 
against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. Perfect and near perfect 
correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis window (see 
asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) N/A -0.51 -0.30 
Cairn Energy (n=5) 0.04 0.08 0.61 
Table B.23: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs prior to the EU ETS (2000-2004). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=3) 0.28 -0.20 -0.55 -0.93 
BP* (n=3) 0.34 0.40 -0.95 0.33 
Table B.24: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil* (n=3) -0.69 -1.00 0.97 
Chevron* (n=3) -0.50 0.88 0.96 
ConocoPhillips (n=3) -0.01 0.81 0.04 
Canadian Natural Resources* (n=3) 0.14 0.45 0.94 
Table B.25: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil* (n=3) N/A 1.00 0.94 
Cairn Energy (n=3) 0.89 0.91 N/A 
Table B.26: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. Perfect 
and near perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short 
analysis window (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) -0.38 -0.36 0.12 -0.13 
Total* (n=3) 0.12 -0.92 0.58 0.08 
Table B.27: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. 
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Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=5) 0.70 0.72 0.34 
Chevron (n=5) 0.46 0.77 0.67 
ConocoPhillips (n=5) 0.82 0.81 0.09 
Canadian Natural Resources (n=5) 0.36 0.24 -0.15 
Andeavor (n=4) -0.84 -0.81 -0.81 
Hess (n=5) -0.10 -0.48 -0.80 
Marathon Oil* (n=3) -0.80 -0.96 0.80 
Table B.28: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) -0.19 0.53 0.46 
Cairn Energy* (n=5) -0.11 -0.33 1.00 
Premier Oil (n=3) 0.94 0.84 -0.77 
Table B.29: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. Perfect 
and near perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short 
analysis window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.72 
Total (n=5) -0.03 0.33 -0.68 0.38 
BP (n=5) 0.64 0.19 0.52 0.67 
Table B.30: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=5) 0.69 0.68 0.28 
Chevron (n=5) -0.38 -0.40 -0.16 
ConocoPhillips (n=5) 0.59 0.58 0.44 
Occidental* (n=3) 0.95 0.96 1.00 
Canadian Natural Resources (n=5) -0.40 -0.36 -0.45 
Pioneer Natural Resources (n=2)* 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Andeavor (n=5) -0.47 -0.79 -0.79 
Hess (n=5) -0.57 -0.51 -0.91 
Marathon Oil* (n=5) -0.47 -0.58 -0.98 
Apache (n=5) 0.12 0.19 0.17 
Table B.31: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) 0.25 0.80 -0.66 
Tullow Oil (n=5) 0.24 -0.61 -0.21 
Cairn Energy (n=5) -0.52 -0.81 -0.68 
Premier Oil (n=5) -0.02 -0.10 0.14 
Table B.32: Correlation coefficients between nitrous oxide emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual nitrous oxide emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual nitrous oxide emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) 0.42 0.04 0.36 0.76 
BP* (n=5) -0.98 -0.99 -0.37 0.00 
Table B.33: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs prior to 
the EU ETS (2000-2004). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total 
annual methane emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income analyzed against 
regional annual methane emissions. Perfect and near perfect correlations due 
to limited data availability and short analysis window (see asterisked 
companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) N/A -0.47 -0.06 
Cairn Energy (n=5) 0.94 0.88 0.88 
Table B.34: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance for European CLaSLCs prior to the EU ETS (2000-2004). 
ROE and Total Net Income analyzed against total annual methane 
emissions. Europe Net Income analyzed against regional annual methane 
emissions. 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell* (n=3) 0.83 -0.95 -0.97 0.98 
BP* (n=3) 0.91 0.39 0.93 0.98 
Table B.35: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual methane emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual methane emissions. Perfect and near 
perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Chevron* (n=3) 0.93 -0.98 -0.19 
ConocoPhillips (n=3) -0.75 0.11 -0.63 
Hess (n=3) 0.48 -0.34 -0.58 
Table B.36: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual methane emissions. U.S. Net Income analyzed 
against regional annual methane emissions. Perfect and near perfect 
correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis window (see 
asterisked companies). 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil* (n=3) N/A 0.99 0.62 
Cairn Energy (n=3) 0.90 0.88 N/A 
Table B.37: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase I of the EU ETS (2005-2007). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual methane emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual methane emissions. Perfect and 
near perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) 0.07 0.04 0.27 -0.52 
Total (n=3) -0.70 -0.28 0.79 0.93 
BP (n=5) -0.08 0.33 -0.34 -0.30 
Table B.38: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual methane emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual methane emissions. 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=5) 0.08 0.44 -0.25 
Chevron (n=5) 0.21 0.76 0.55 
ConocoPhillips (n=5) 0.90 0.91 -0.15 
Hess (n=5) -0.53 0.55 -0.18 
Table B.39: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual methane emissions. U.S. Net Income analyzed 
against regional annual methane emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) 0.23 -0.77 -0.51 
Tullow Oil (n=5) 0.31 0.58 0.36 
Cairn Energy* (n=5) -0.19 -0.30 1.00 
Premier Oil* (n=3) 1.00 0.96 -0.95 
Table B.40: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase II of the EU ETS (2008-2012). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual methane emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual methane emissions. Perfect and 
near perfect correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis 
window (see asterisked companies). 
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Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income U.S. Net Income 
Shell (n=5) -0.85 -0.70 -0.91 -0.65 
Total (n=5) -0.92 -0.68 -0.90 0.36 
BP (n=5) 0.06 -0.20 0.85 0.58 
Table B.41: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for DLCs during 
Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net Income analyzed 
against total annual methane emissions. Europe and U.S. Net Income 
analyzed against regional annual methane emissions. 
 
Company ROE Total Net Income U.S. Net Income 
ExxonMobil (n=5) -0.21 -0.22 0.13 
Chevron (n=5) 0.35 0.34 -0.57 
ConocoPhillips (n=5) 0.49 0.50 0.19 
Occidental (n=3) 0.55 0.60 0.63 
Anadarko (n=3) -0.91 -0.87 -0.75 
Hess (n=5) -0.29 -0.38 -0.55 
Devon Energy* (n=3) -1.00 -1.00 -0.71 
Marathon Oil (n=5) 0.85 0.90 -0.42 
Apache (n=5) 0.90 0.80 0.65 
Table B.42: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for U.S. CLaSLCs 
during Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net Income 
analyzed against total annual methane emissions. U.S. Net Income analyzed 
against regional annual methane emissions. Perfect and near perfect 
correlations due to limited data availability and short analysis window (see 
asterisked companies). 
  
 110 
Company ROE Total Net Income Europe Net Income 
PJSC Lukoil (n=5) -0.04 0.51 -0.70 
Tullow Oil (n=5) 0.49 0.50 0.17 
Cairn Energy (n=5) -0.44 -0.53 -0.53 
Premier Oil (n=5) 0.40 0.44 0.51 
Enquest (n=5) 0.35 0.44 0.49 
Table B.43: Correlation coefficients between methane emissions and economic 
performance (ROE and Total and Regional Net Income) for European 
CLaSLCs during Phase III of the EU ETS (2013-2017). ROE and Total Net 
Income analyzed against total annual methane emissions. Europe Net 
Income analyzed against regional annual methane emissions. 
Appendix B.3:  Plots of Overall Correlation between Economic Performance and 
Emissions 
(Appendix starts on following page)
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Figure B.1: Correlation coefficients for carbon dioxide emissions against economic performance (ROE and Regional Net 
Income) for all datasets over the period 2005 through 2017. See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for 
tables of correlation coefficients. 
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Figure B.2: Correlation coefficients for nitrous oxide emissions against economic performance (ROE and Regional Net 
Income) for the period 2005 through 2017. See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables of correlation 
coefficients. 
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Figure B.3: Correlation coefficients for methane emissions against economic performance (ROE and Regional Net Income) 
for the period 2005 through 2017. See Appendix A for raw data and Appendix B for tables of correlation 
coefficients. 
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APPENDIX C:  PLOTS OF RAW EMISSIONS DATA 
(Appendix starts on following page)
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Figure C.1: Total company carbon dioxide emissions for DLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A. 
 
 
 -
 20,000,000
 40,000,000
 60,000,000
 80,000,000
 100,000,000
 120,000,000
 140,000,000
 160,000,000
 180,000,000
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
M
e
tr
ic
 T
o
n
s 
o
f 
C
a
rb
o
n
 D
io
xi
d
e
Total Company Carbon Dioxide Emissions for DLC Dataset
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL
TOTAL S.A.
BP P.L.C.
 116 
Figure C.2: Total company nitrous oxide emissions for DLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A. Low emissions 
for Total inferred to be results of a reporting error. 
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Figure C.3: Total company methane emissions for DLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A. 
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Figure C.4: Total company carbon dioxide emissions for U.S. CLaSLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A. 
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Figure C.5: Total company nitrous oxide emissions for U.S. CLaSLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A. 
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Figure C.6: Total company methane emissions for U.S. CLaSLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A 
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Figure C.7: Total company carbon dioxide emissions for European CLaSLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A 
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Figure C.8: Total company nitrous oxide emissions for European CLaSLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A. 
Note that the abnormal readings for Cairn Energy between 2005 and 2012 may be the result of inaccurate 
reporting. 
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Figure C.9: Total company methane emissions for European CLaSLCs. Plotted from the data available in Appendix A. 
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Glossary 
CER – Certified Emissions Reductions 
CLaSLCs – Cross Listed and Single Listing Companies 
DLC – Dual Listed Company 
EIA – Energy Information Administration 
EpMTC – Euros per Metric Ton of Carbon Dioxide 
ESG – Environmental, Social, Governance 
EU – European Union 
EUR/MWh – Euros per megawatt hour 
EU ETS – European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
LSE – London Stock Exchange 
NYSE – New York Stock Exchange 
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ROE – Return on Equity 
U.S. – United States 
US EPA – United States Environmental Protection Agency 
VAT – Value Added Tax 
WACC – Weighted Average Cost of Capita 
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